In a post he calls "Balkan Smashmouth," Streetwise Professor exposes the sucker play that Russia is trying to foist upon Serbia; the net result will be that Serbia will be stripped of its assets and enslaved by Russia, the first post-Soviet state to slip back behind the Iron Curtain. Smooth move, Serbia!

The Daily Mirror reports:

Fighter jets were scrambled to intercept two Russian bombers as they headed for British airspace yesterday. Tornados and F-16 jets escorted the long-range Tu-160s bombers south towards the Bay of Biscay where Russia is staging its biggest military exercise since the Soviet era. Their navy is currently test-firing missiles from warships there in a show of strength by President Putin before the presidential election.

The MoD said it was a "routine" response but angry Foreign Secretary David Miliband added: "Russia's action is reminiscent of the Cold War."

The incident reflects the rise in tension between the countries after the murder in London of ex-KGB officer Alexander Litvinenko. Last week the Government was forced to close the British Council offices in Russia after a "campaign of intimidation" against staff.

Dare we wonder how Russians would respond if a British bomber behaved in this way? It's barbarism, pure and simple. The act of a savage nation, and the fact that Mr. Putin dares to complain that people think of his nation that way, whilst he continues to order these provocations, is bizarre and thoroughly neo-Soviet.

(1) The Sunday Photos: YouTube Edition

(2) The Sunday Survey

(3) The Sunday Persecution

(4) The Sunday Cinema

(5) The Sunday Sleuth

(6) The Sunday Book Review


NOTE: The Washington Post now has a major article on Oleg Kozlovsky, with a photograph, via their brilliant Russia correspondent Peter Finn. That's now the third MSM report on him, following the Economist and Chicago Tribune -- and all long after we first broke the story.

NOTE: Over on Publius Pundit we've posted a video that shows the lurid nude photo history of various new members of the Russian Duma.

Attorney/blogger Robert Amsterdam continues his leadership role in providing video material documenting the heroic work of the great Russian patriots at Oborona. In his latest two installments (he has his own YouTube channel) he offers the second part of an interview with Oleg Kozlovsky, the group's leader, and two others with an activists on the front lines:

Back in November, we reported on poll data showing that, contrary to the absurd propaganda spewed by the Kremlin, Americans are significantly less warlike than Russians.

Now, here's more proof from the same polling agency, World Public Opinion:

The first chart shows that the percentage of American who favor a treaty prohibiting attacks on satellites is far higher (20%) than the percentage of Russians who favor such a treaty:



The second chart shows that the percentage of Americans who support self-restraint in placing weapons in space is also much higher (16%) than the percentage of Russians who favor such restraint.

Another interesting feature of these polls is that while 99% of Americans who were asked the question were able to to answer, only 76% of Russians could give an opinion to the first question and only 88% could respond to the second (those unable to respond being reflected by a large white gap in the bar graph for Russia).

A letter to the editor of the Moscow Times:

Editor,

So Andrei Lugovoi allegedly assassinated Alexander Litvinenko. And that's fine -- he becomes a hero, gets elected to the State Duma and is appointed second head of the LDPR party list. He also gets asked if he will run for president.

Vitaly Kaloyev, the architect from the Caucasus region of North Ossetia, assassinates Peter Nielsen, a Swiss-based air-traffic controller, and Kaloyev gets a senior government job in his hometown.

Now, just what message about Russian society and morals does that send?

Giles Cattermole
Sonning-on-Thames, U.K.

A Moscow Times Editorial:

The harassment this week of campaign workers trying to get Mikhail Kasyanov registered for the March 2 presidential election is a clear, a well-coordinated effort designed either to discredit the former prime minister or force him out of the race altogether.

First police and Federal Security Service agents detained Rustam Abdullin, the head of Kasyanov's campaign headquarters in Ioshkar-Ola, the capital of Marii-El. Abdullin was detained on suspicion of forging 50,000 signatures, and prosecutors then opened a criminal case against him. He maintains that the signatures are legitimate. Federal prosecutors also announced on Tuesday that a similar case had been opened in the Yaroslavl region.

According to Kasyanov campaign representatives, officers from the Interior Ministry's organized crime and terrorism unit also found time in their busy schedules to go door to door in several regions for "informal" talks with those collecting signatures for Kasyanov. The campaign officials say this was an attempt to intimidate the collectors into making false statements that they had faked signatures.

The Central Elections Commission is expected to announce whether Kasyanov will be allowed to run on Sunday, but its secretary, Nikolai Konkin, has already made it clear that the answer will likely be no. Konkin said Thursday that the commission had determined that 13 percent of the signatures submitted by his campaign were invalid, and that this was proper grounds to refuse his candidacy.

Kasyanov, meanwhile, maintains that the commission's decision will have nothing to do with signatures and everything to do with whether President Vladimir Putin -- who has already named First Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev as his preferred candidate -- wants him in the race.

We don't know if Kasyanov is right in his assessment or, if there is a campaign against his supporters, who is coordinating it and at what level. But if those supporting Medvedev's candidacy want his election to seem a legitimate exercise in democracy rather than a carefully scripted and fully orchestrated charade, then the most intelligent approach would be to leave Kasyanov's people alone. The Central Elections Commission should be guided by evidence and the law when deciding if Kasyanov should be allowed to run.

What makes the authorities' behavior so puzzling is that Kasyanov has virtually no chance of winning. Medvedev is already the choice of over 80 percent of voters, according to the latest nationwide survey by the Levada Center, while Kasyanov's level of support was below the margin of error. The prospect of his supporters hitting the streets in a successful Orange Revolution-style protest that so concerns the Kremlin is difficult to take seriously. Thus, lifting the pressure from Kasyanov's campaign team and allowing him to run would be no threat to Medvedev. On the contrary, both Medvedev and the country's image stand to gain from holding an open campaign in compliance with election law and democratic principles.

Well now here's something. Russia features very prominently at this years Oscars. Though perhaps not in the way the dictator Vladimir Putin would wish.

A Russian film called "12" is nominated for an Academy Award as best foreign-language film this year.

Four very interesting facts.

First, this "Russian" film is actually a remake. Of an American film. Called "12 Angry Men" which starred Henry Fonda.

Second, the film explores the horror of Russian racism against Chechens.

Third, the competition for this film comes from . . . wait for it . . . a Polish film called "Katyn." It's about the cold-blooded mass-murder of Polish officers during World War II by Russians.

And fourth, it seems the Academy has predilection for the Russian film's director, Nikita Mikhalkov, since he has been nominated before, winning for a film illustrating the horrors of the rule of Josef Stalin.

Ouch. Dictatorship, racism, mass murder and America all associated with Russia in front of a worldwide TV audience. Not exactly a major coup for the Putin regime, now is it? Doubly painful for Putin must be the fact that it's pretty hard to argue Americans are ignorant anti-Russians if they are nominated Russian films for awards, now isn't it?

Incidentally, Russia also has a nomination in the category Best Short Animated Film for something called "My Love" by director Aleksandr Petrov. If anybody knows anything about this obscure item, we'd love to hear about it.

The Daily Record reports:

Russian president Vladimir Putin may have secretly amassed a huge fortune. Political insiders say the Kremlin leader could be the richest man in Europe, with hidden wealth totalling £20billion. Allegations of corruption have been strenuously denied by Putin's cronies. But yesterday, a British Government source said: "There are legitimate questions to be asked." And political analyst Stanislav Belkovsky has challenged Putin to take him to court if he denies amassing the fortune from Russian energy companies. Dmitry Medvedev, the man who will succeed Putin in the Kremlin, admitted last week that corruption was rife. He said: "Corruption in the official structures has a huge scale and the fight against it should become a national programme." The claims will fuel the diplomatic row between Britain and Russia following the murder of Alexander Litvinenko in London. In a separate move, the Russian official who shut down the British Council in two Russian cities was accused of hypocrisy for sending his daughter to university in London. British ambassador Sir Tony Brenton said: "It is surprising that the Russian elite are taking these opportunities in London but barring ordinary Russians from using these benefits."

Paul Goble reports:

One of the most controversial best sellers in the Russian Federation during the past year is “Gastarbeiter,” a lightly fictionalized account of its ethnic Azerbaijani author’s life as an illegal foreign worker who fled Turkmenistan where he was born to seek his fortune in the turbulent Moscow of the 1990s. This week, Moscow media featured both an extensive review of Eduard Bagirov’s novel and an interview with him about why he wrote it and how he sees the future, two articles that have attracted particular attention because of the brawl between Azerbaijanis and Armenians in a Moscow neighborhood on Monday.

Writing on the Polar Star portal, Nikita Mendkovich notes that the central theme of Bagirov’s novel is the extraordinary difficulties Azerbaijanis and other non-Russians living in the Russian capital now face in trying to cope with the rising level of xenophobic attitudes among Russians. Many reviewers have reasonably suggested that the novel overstates this problem, Mendkovich says, and he cites a review in Komsomol’skaya Pravda on July 17 which argued that “by the 20th page [of this book], it seems that [the novel’s hero] has arrived not in Russia but in some kind of Polar Reich.” But if Mendkovich points out that Bagirov seems to be equally critical of the attitudes his hero meets as well. Indeed, the reviewer says, the only entirely “normal” in the book is an ethnic Ukrainian with whom the main character organizes a firm – and Bagirov makes clear that even he has his shortcomings. Moreover, however angry Bagirov’s hero may be about people living in Moscow and Russia, Mendkovich continues, the write makes it clear that he and his hero both have “a deep and sincere love for Russia and for Moscow,” one that the critic acknowledges is often deeper than that displayed by longtime residents.

Like many Russian critics and Russian readers, Mendkovich focuses on a scene in the book in which an elderly Azerbaijani explains to Russians why the terrorist actions in 1999 which most Russians continue to believe were organized and carried out by Chechen militants. In Bagirov’s account, the Azerbaijani says: The terrorists “don’t have any families. No and that’s because you killed them… Yes … In the middle of the night, your tanks shot into the homes where their wives and children were peacefully sleeping. And then you shot their fathers, cut down their mothers, and raped their sisters.” Given all that, the elderly man continues, no one should be surprised that “these men have gone insane and begun to blow up peaceful residents” here in response to what the Russians have done.

In addition, Mendkovich writes, Bagirov’s suggestions that non-Russians have thoroughly penetrated key institutions in Moscow and that ethnic Russians almost certainly will be used by rabid Russian nationalists on their websites to mobilize their followers. But by presenting his story in such a dark and unqualified way, Mendkovich says, Bagirov has failed in what the Moscow critic says is the first task of a novelist exploring social problems: to understand and explain rather than simply to describe and attack. And because of that, the critic says, he does not expect much from Bagirov in the future. Bagirov in effect responds to such criticism in the course of an extensive interview about his life and writings that he gave to Azeri.ru, one of the increasingly numerous websites directed at the more than two million ethnic Azerbaijanis now living in the Russian Federation.

Saying that “80 percent” of his novel is based on his own life, Bagirov noted that he was born in Soviet Turkmenistan to “a mother [who was] a native of Russia [and] a father [who was] an Azerbaijani,” could not get into a university because he lacked the money for the necessary bribe, deserted from its army, and fled to Russia at the age of 18. The novelist said that his book was not only his own story but “the biography of tens of millions of people with a similar fate, who have the same problems with their names and nationalities in Moscow as [he] had.” And consequently, he said, it had never occurred to him to hide his background. “I am Eduard Bagirov,” he said. “I am an Azerbaijani!” At the same time, and again like his hero in the book, Bagirov said that he loves Russia and Moscow and believes both Russians and non-Russians must work to find a way to live together amicably, rather than as now viewing each other in a negative way. Many Russians, like the critic Mendkovich, would argue that Bagirov has not contributed to reducing ethnic hostility but rather exacerbates inter-ethnic hostility. He explicitly denied that and argued that his novel, by raising these issues, has prompted some on each side of this divide to change their views of the other.

However that may be, many in the Russian capital and beyond are certain to reflect upon what could happen in Moscow if such tensions among the various groups continue to manifest themselves as they did earlier this week in two large confrontations between Azerbaijanis and Armenians there. Fortunately, as one Baku newspaper noted, the Russian militia intervened in a timely fashion to limit these clashes. But Bagirov’s novel and the experiences of his own life on which it is based help to explain why these latest outbreaks happened and why inter-ethnic tensions in Moscow could so easily explode.

(1) Kozlovsky Speaks!

(2) Another Original LR Translation: The Kremlin Declares War on the Internet

(3) EDITORIAL: The "Method" to Putin's Madness

(4) Annals of Russian Barbarism I: Indicting Kasyanov

(5) Annals of Russian Barbarism II: Double Jeopardy

(6) Latynina on the British Council Outrage

(7) Russia Loses, and then it Loses Again

NOTE: In our latest installment on Publius Pundit, we expose the total failure of the Putin administration across every conceivable criteria, bursting the absurd bubble of illusion that surrounds it. Check it out, and feel free to add your comments as to why some of us are so easily duped and why the Russian people lead that list.

Oborona reports on an interview of Oleg Kozlovsky from the Russian press, a Ryazan tabloid called "Pokoleniye" ("Generation") complete with a photograph of Oleg taken during his illegal internment with the Russian miltary at a Ryazan base (LR staff translation, not by our expert consultants, corrections welcome):

GENERATION: Tell us, in a nutshell, your current status:

OLEG KOZLOVSKY: I'm to undergo a second medical evaluation by experts in Moscow to confirm the results of the first, done here in Ryazan. I expect the Moscow results to be the same, if there is no external pressure. I hope to learn the results on Monday. It seems the High Command is riveted by my activities and I am constantly monitored. A Lieutenant-General has followed me throughout the course of my medical screening, reporting back to his superiors. His rank alone shows my significance to the authorities and the fact that the interest runs to the highest levels. I am constantly asked by my superiors why the outside world is paying so much attention to me. It's become clear to me that I have widespread support in my plight, and that many are shocked by the manner in which I was brought here. To accomplish this legally would have required many months of bureaucratic activity, you see.

Tell us what happened when you were seized.

On the morning of December 20, 2007, I left the place where I'd spent the night (it's not my permanent address) and encountered a uniformed law enforcement officer, who said that I should go with him in the Izmailovksy Military Enlistment Office to "solve a few problems." I had been to that office many times in the past to deal with bureaucratic issues regarding my military paperwork, so I had no reason to think I would be kidnapped. I went with the officer to his police cruiser and found there two more men in plain clothes. I asked them who they were and they said they were employees of the enlistment office. None of them would show me their identity documents. I was later informed that the two in plain clothes were FSB agents.

I was informed that I had to immediately present myself for medical examination. In informed them of my status as a reserve officer and full-time student, indicating this made me ineligible for induction, but they persisted, telling me that. Employees military enlistment assured me that this examination was "only a formality" and that afterwards I would be allowed to return home. My first thought was that they simply wanted me off the street for a little while in light of the pending elections, but then I soon realized that the matter was much more serious. I was able to pass a brief message to my colleagues at Oborona, then was rushed through a medical review (it took all of 15 minutes) and smuggled out a rear entrance to the induction barracks in the Moscow suburbs. The military vehicle that transported me to the barracks was accompanied by a police vehicle using lights and sirens to clear the way and make the transit as rapid as possible.

What happened after you got to the barracks?

As soon as I arrived I was brought before the commanding officer. After explaining my situation to him, he agreed to send me to a Moscow hospital for reexamination and assessment of my medical condition. No sooner had I arrived there, however, when several soldiers appeared, accompanied by some plain clothes agents driving a black Volga, seized me and transported me to Ryazan. I was not given the opportunity to inform my family of my removal.

What happened when you got to Ryazan?

At first I was placed in a tiny unit stationed far out in the countryside, far from the nearest village, obviously covering their tracks. But after speaking with the staff there I was able to obtain my transfer to a military hospital in the city.

It all seems to have occurred with remarkable speed.

Yes, what occurred in my case usually requires a much longer period for the ordinary soldier. Obviously, they needed me out of Moscow as soon as possible. However, my colleagues immediately filed a complaint calling for an investigation of the Izmailovsky office, and although I have no illusions about its prospects for success I retain the hope that justice will prevail and those responsible will be held accountable.

How were you treated at the Ryzan hospital?

I cannot complain, they've gone by the book, conducting themselves with honor and seeking to rectify the transgressions of their Moscow colleagues.

How long do you expect to stay here?

The documents say that a decision should be made on Monday. If the Moscow forces do not interfere, I will be discharged.

How do you explain what's happened to you?

I can't, nobody can. But I'm not the only person who's been victimized by conscription, there are many others. I've been able to protect myself and demand justice, but many others have not been so lucky. In fact, we don't even know they exist. I would like to add that this incident won't change my political activity, I'll continue it. In fact, it only increases my confidence and commitment that I'm on the right path, because somebody wants to put me off it.

Although your experience has been brief, what are your impressions of service in the Russian Army?

The Army is in crisis. Rather than reform it and fill it with recruits who truly wish to serve, the Ministry of Defense is ignoring its needs and relying on involuntary conscription. And this applies equally to the officer corps. Is it possible to force a person to put forth his best efforts? I think not.

What will you do after you are discharged?

I will not let the matter drop. I will pursue all means of legal redress to hold those responsible accountable for their actions. If the Izmailovsky office will not admit that their actions were ordered from above, then they must bear the full brunt of responsibility.

Any final thoughts?

I would like to express my appreciation to all those who have supported me, who have filed appeals on my behalf and who have demanded my release. All those who have gone to the streets to protest on my behalf. I thank you, all those who have not deserted me! And I urge all young people in Russia to stand up and fight for their rights and never bow down before the arbitrary actions of our bureaucrats.

While Vladimir Putin is building a “Golden Bunker” through his stand-ins [TN: a $50 million residence known as "Villa Konstantin" which is rumored being built for him in Switzerland], the Kremlin administration has come up with a new way of interfering in citizens’ private lives and isolating the country from the rest of the world. In the best traditions of the Cold War, the Special Services will have the exclusive means to deprive all those living in the Russian Federation of the right to read and write.

In a couple of months’ time, the horrors of censorship depicted by George Orwell in 1984 will seem like childish pranks compared to the powers granted to the FSB and other security organs in their instructions. Their work will be greatly simplified, and all “dissidents” will turn themselves into “Iron” Felix Dzerzhinsky [TN: First leader of the Cheka, later the KGB] themselves.

According to the Guardian, Russian internet users, will be completely locked off from foreign traffic, which can be used to access the majority of free information, as currently happens in China. Those whose work requires access to foreign sites (ministries, departments and state companies) will have to be approved by the Special Services.

In practice, this will be achieved by the introduction of Cyrillic domain names, which will automatically cut the whole of Russia off from the World Wide Web and the Internet’s other services.

“The “Russian Internet” project will look at the question of how they can best communicate within their own country. The internationalization of domain names will give them the chance to do what is being attempted in China, where three top-level domain names, written in Chinese characters, are used: .net, .com and .cn”, Wolfgang Kleinwachter, member of the UN Working Group on Internet Governance, explains the technical details.

The key question here is whether Russia’s own root servers will use Russian international domain names when deciding where to direct their enquiries on the Internet—that is will they be autonomous from the already existing root servers of the net, which are mainly based in the USA (5 in the USA, 2 in Northern Europe).

In Kleinwachter’s opinion, the worst case scenario would be everyone having to register domain names using the Cyrillic top-level domain .rf. “Then Russian would have its own root name server, and it is much easier to control a top-level domain than a hundred thousand subdomains”, says the expert.

The Chinese Model

The FSB is taking a tried and tested route; it’s not reinventing the wheel. Russians will end up as isolated as the Chinese.

Furthermore, the Chinese authorities are at the stage of perfecting Internet censorship.

“Now the Chinese side has a choice: to preserve for itself the domain .cn in ASCII code, or to isolate it, “ explains Kleinwachter, “If they isolate it, then they will be able to build their own individual bridge which will link the Chinese Internet with the ASCII internet. The Russians, like the Chinese, have considered this variant. I’m under the impression that the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is more inclined to accept this variant than the Chinese Ministry of Economic Development and Trade”.

Specialists aren’t excluding one other variant. Every citizen could be given a fixed IP address, which they would have to use wherever they gained access to the Internet.

The Electronic Curtain

“According to the estimates on the Russian side, 90% of the information exchange will take place within Russia and only 10% will go outside, “ says Kleinwachter. In these circumstances it is this 10% who will feel the difference from the previous situation most of all.

According to Kleinwachter, it has been suggested that people will require a password sanctioned by state authorities to access the global Internet. In this way, the Kremlin will be able to control each citizen’s contact with the outside world.

The authorities however assert that this will make tracing “cyber-criminals” easier.

Anyone wishing to read the European press, including the Ukrainian, will now become a dangerous criminal; in the same way as everyone going to a demonstration instantly turns into an “extremist”.

“Legal” hackers

Western IT specialists point out that this innovation makes all Russian hackers absolutely untraceable. “This would result in a wall being built being cyber-criminals and their victims” believes Jose Nazario of the company Arbor, who defends the state and corporations from attacks from hackers originating from Russian territory.

“Tracing Russian hackers will become very complicated. Security experts are now only just beginning to understand their methods, and this decision would slow our work down considerably. Aside from this, it is a sign of the increasing strain in the relations between Putin’s Russian and the West”, emphasizes Nazario.

NOTE: This article has nearly 100 comments attached, for those who read Russian.

Does it make any "sense" to you that Russia is going to start Soviet-style parades through Red Square again, with tanks and missiles and such? Can you "explain" why a Russian general would go on national TV and say that he wouldn't hesitate to use nuclear weapons in a first strike to repel a conventional attack? After all, wouldn't such actions be likely to provoke a new arms race with the United States, a country that has an economy 12 times bigger than Russia's and lots of allies?

What kind of "sense" does it make for the Kremlin, as we report below, to open a criminal investigation against the only legitimate opposition candidate in upcoming presidential elections, former prime minister Mikhail Kasyanov? Even if he's really guilty of fraudulently obtaining signatures to support his candidacy, he's a former appointee of Vladimir Putin himself, so what does that say about Putin's judgment? And the world is already hypercritical of Russia's slide into dictatorship -- so much so that Putin is attempting to create his own "democracy agency" to find fault with the democracies of the West, apparently seeking to divert attention from Russia's egregious crackdown. Is Putin really so afraid of dissent that he can't even stand the idea of a person being able to collect enough signatures to run for president without his approval, even though that person has no chance of winning? Can he be that much of a girly man? Come to think of it, what kind of sense does it make for Russia to lecture the world about democracy? Surely the Kremlin realizes that nobody on the planet, except maybe a few of the most ignorant among the Russian citizens it has played for suckers, would believe anything such an agency said. Don't they?

Surely the Kremlin understands how pathetically weak such actions would make it look, and that this would be utterly inconsistent with its bid for a place at the big-league negotiating table with the grownups, right? Surely, Mr. Putin understands that his critics will seize these actions as further proof of Russia's inherently savage nature, which makes him bristle so. Doesn't he?

Writing about the British Council scandal in the Washington Post, Masha Lipman of the Carnegie Foundation stated:

Consider also the domestic perspective on this row. Angry assertions of Russia's global standing dovetail with Soviet-style isolationism, which breeds suspicion about Western values and influence. The Kremlin is increasingly wary of autonomous groups, especially those that receive Western financial backing. After Putin's notorious 2004 reference to such organizations -- "they don't bite the hand that feeds them" -- nongovernmental and human rights organizations receiving foreign grants have been consistently discredited. Harassment of such groups is growing. In Soviet times, anti-Western propaganda was an element of the totalitarian state, with its sealed borders and rigid ideology aimed at defeating capitalism. In today's Russia, a nation with free trade and free travel, where cable television and Internet access are unrestricted, such policies appear irrational and anachronistic. Russia's business ties with Western countries are expanding. Relations with Britain, especially, extend beyond economic investments: London has become wealthy Russians' favorite choice for residences, high-quality education and enjoyable getaways. Last year, though, Britain suspended talks on facilitating the visa process, and Russians' entry to Britain may be further restricted. British Prime Minister Gordon Brown has called the attacks "totally unacceptable" and noted that the only countries in which the British Council faced serious trouble were Burma and Iran. Yet Kremlin leaders apparently believe that making the world reckon with Russia is worth the harm such company does to the country's image.

Is the Kremlin really acting irrationally? Let's see.

Lipman says Russia is "a nation nation with free trade and free travel, where cable television and Internet access are unrestricted." That's clearly not correct. Trade, travel, TV and Internet access are restricted, by the most severe and effective limit there is, the pocketbook. Russians who earn an average wage of $4/hour and who, the men at least, don't live to see their sixtieth year, may well have far more immediate concerns than acquiring political knowledge and taking political action. It's called staying alive. What's more, as we've documented here so often, the Kremlin is aggressively moving to seize control of the Internet, first and foremost by launching criminal prosecutions against those who use it to criticize the Kremlin, with a profound chilling effect. So, if the Kremlin is relying on that restriction, then it's perfectly rational to want to see it continue by keeping the Russian population poor and sick. To be sure, a healthy, wealthy population could make use of Russia's political climate being less restrictive than it was in Soviet times and perhaps generate real, widespread opposition to the Kremlin's belligerent foreign policy.

On top of that, Lipman seems to assume that Russians are generally disposed to be fair-minded in regard to foreigners, and that's simply nonsense. It's the opposite of the truth. Most Russians are only too willing to swallow the Kremlin's xenophobic propaganda hook, line and sinker. The fact that there might be a bit of access to competing views on expensive TV and English-language websites means little when the Kremlin's propaganda is everywhere, 24/7, and backed up by a patronage network many Russian depend on for their survival.

In short, the Kremlin's efforts to attack the British Council, and all things foreign, is not only rational given the Kremlin's worldview, it's merely the reverberation of a constant drumbeat that is the hallmark of Russian history that predates the Romanov dynasty.

Now, to be sure, if we define "rationality" as the desire to have the Russian people at their best and happiest, then the Kremlin's policy of keeping them weak, sick and miserable makes no sense. If it's "rational" to make friends in international affairs rather than enemies, especially for a weak nation that lacks the ability to sustain itself on its own (but rather depends, for example, on the international oil markets), then the Kremlin's policy of alienating every nation on the face of the Earth is crazy.

But if the Kremlin needs a weak population, then it's perfectly logical to try to cut off access by any foreigners who might make them stronger, just as was done in Soviet times. Conveniently, xenophobia also provides the opportunity to terrify the population regarding the need for protection from evil enemies and the need for ever-greater Kremlin power to do so. The combination of Stalin-like threats of blunt trauma combined with Stalin-like domination over the mass media, combined with the historically proven, craven Russian refusal to question their own government except in times of most dire urgency, means that, regardless of a small amount of competition that might exist, the Kremlin can win the day in the short term.

This reality is why the story about the Emperor and his new clothes was invented. Imagine that, in the story, any person who even started to giggle when viewing the naked Emperor was immediately shot dead. The Emperor could go on for quite some time in his birthday suit before any chickens came home to roost, couldn't he?

Putin presides over a fundamentally weak and illegitimate regime. He can't afford to have a kid like Oleg Kozlovsky, much less a former prime minister like Mikhail Kasyanov, making public criticisms of him, even though he knows it can't actually influence the result of the next election. He's afraid it could plant the seeds of doubt, seeds that could sprout into mighty oaks of dissent should, say, the price of oil happen to fall owing to a major decline in U.S. demand owing to a U.S. recession. It's actually all very logical, if you think about it.

What still seems strange, of course, is the idea that Putin and his KGB cohorts wouldn't realize that, sooner or later, their fraud would bring them down. But it's not really that strange, not if you know Russia. Two simple reasons explain it.

First, hatred of the West, and most especially America. If there's any irrationality afoot regarding Russia, it's the irrationality on our part of failing to understand that if Russians hated us before we beat them in the Cold War, then they hate us twice as much now, because we beat them. And of all the Russians who hate us, the KGB would naturally hate us the most. That kind of hate can make you blind to your own best interests, just as it did in Soviet times. What else would explain actions like Nikita Khrushchev taking off his shoe at the U.N.? Remember, he was one of the USSR's more moderate leaders. Why would he say "we will bury you" like that? Isn't it just giving a warning, an opportunity for your adversary to prepare better and possibly defeat you? It seems irrational, and yet it was done, and if you know anything about Russian politics then you know that kind of thing is actually quite commonplace, like say the president of Russia joking about rape in front of a diplomatic delegation, something that happened quite recently.

And second, much more important, seething contempt for the people of Russia, who've always been a mighty disappointment to the nation's rulers. Something that's very little known about Russian history, and in the Russian people's favor, is that a relatively small fraction of the population actively supported removing the Tsar and installing a Bolshevik regime. Nothing like a majority ever joined the Communist Party, and an even tinier cadre participated in bringing down the Soviet dictatorship. Mostly, what the people of Russia, often inebriated, have done during such events is to simply stand on the sidelines with their hands folded gaping in slack-jawed bemusement. Imagine being a Russian leader who felt he was risking his life to "save" the people only to meet this reaction. It'd be pretty darned frustrating, wouldn't it?

A well-documented phenomenon of human psychology leads us to want to think of Russians as being our friends rather than our enemies, and as being rational rather than irrational. The latter is so much safer and more comforting. And malignant little trolls like Vladimir Putin trade on that human tendency, it conveniently helps them consolidate their power.

The Moscow Times reports that just as before the last presidential election Putin's chief rival Mikhail Khodorkovsky was sent to prison so he couldn't make a challenge to the Kremlin, now Putin's own former prime minister gets the same treatment this time:

Prosecutors announced Tuesday that they had opened a criminal investigation into purportedly forged signatures submitted by former Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov in his attempt to register as a candidate in the March 2 presidential election. Evidence that Kasyanov's campaign workers forged thousands of signatures on petitions to get him on the ballot has been uncovered in the Marii-El republic and the Yaroslavl region, Prosecutor General's Office spokeswoman Tatyana Chernyshyova said. "A criminal investigation has been opened … into the falsification of election documents," Chernyshyova said in televised comments.

Independent candidates must submit 2 million signatures in support of their bids to the Central Elections Commission, which then verifies the signatures. The case involves Rustam Abdullin, the head of Kasyanov's campaign headquarters in Ioshkar-Ola, the capital of Marii-El, who was detained Jan. 11 on suspicion of forging 50,000 signatures, which police found in a bag he was carrying. He has been released, but ordered not to leave the city. Ioshkar-Ola prosecutors determined that 12,000 of those signatures were forged, Chernyshyova said. If charged and convicted with forging election documents, Abdullin could face up to three years in prison.

Reached by telephone Tuesday, Abdullin said the petitions were genuine and accused authorities of pressuring signatories to testify that someone had signed the petitions for them. "We are used to this," Abdullin said. "The authorities are hunting down all the honest politicians. Our work is, and has always been, clean." A criminal case is to be opened as well in the Yaroslavl region city Rybinsk, where prosecutors have uncovered 3,500 forged petitions, Chernyshyova said.

There have been several criminal cases and convictions throughout the country on charges of forging signatures on election documents, including for the independent candidacies of Irina Khakamada, Sergei Glazyev and Ivan Rybkin in the 2004 presidential election. At a hastily called news conference Tuesday at his office in southwest Moscow, Kasyanov said authorities began carrying out a "massive, large-scale campaign of intimidation" against his staff after his preliminary registration as a potential presidential candidate. "The authorities are scared of a genuine political fight," Kasyanov said.

Meanwhile, Central Elections Commission member Nikolai Konkin said that of the 400,000 signatures in support of Kasyanov inspected by the commission as of Tuesday, more than 15.5 percent were invalid. Should Kasyanov make it onto the ballot, polls this week suggest he would suffer an overwhelming defeat: Less than 1 percent of respondents said they would vote for him in a VTsIOM poll released Tuesday. Among the three candidates that have successfully registered, First Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev had 60 percent; Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov had 7.5 percent; and Liberal Democratic Party leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky had 6 percent in the VTsIOM poll.

The only independent candidate other than Kasyanov trying to make it on the ballot, Democratic Party leader Andrei Bogdanov, will likely be registered as a candidate, Konkin, the Central Elections Commission member, said Tuesday. Of the signatures that Bogdanov submitted and have been inspected by election officials, only around 3 percent are invalid, Konkin said. If more than 5 percent of the signatures submitted by a prospective candidate are invalid, he cannot by law be registered.

The commission is to consider Bodgdanov's registration Thursday.

The Moscow Times reports that, just in time for the arrest of Mikhail Kasyanov, Russia is instituting the barbaric practice of double jeopardy, so it can try him over and over no matter how many times a jury might acquit him until it gets a result it likes.

The government has submitted an amendment to the Criminal Procedure Code in the State Duma that would allow for retrials in criminal cases that end in acquittals.

According to proposed changes, acquittals could be overturned in cases where proper procedures were not followed in the selection of the judge, lawyers or jury in a trial or where either side in the trial had been prevented from exercising its rights.

The bill will amend Article 405 of the code, which prevented someone tried and acquitted from facing double jeopardy.

The amendment is the result of a decision by the Constitutional Court in May 2005 that declared Article 405 unconstitutional. The decision was handed down after an appeal from a group — including federal human rights ombudsman Vladimir Lukin — to try to decrease the number of improper rulings.

Less than 0.5 percent of all criminal cases in Russia end in acquittal, compared with an average of 30 percent in Western Europe.

Andrei Pokhmelkin, an expert in criminal law with the Polyakova Independent Council of Legal Experts, said the bill was unlikely to make much of a difference in current conditions, as Russian courts are relatively susceptible to outside pressure.

"From a practical point of view, nothing is likely to change," Pokhmelkin said. "We have very few acquittals in our system and the trend is not improving. The problem is that we don't have independent courts in our country."

Writing in the Moscow Times, hero journalist Yulia Latynina rips the Kremlin several new ones over the British Council outrage:

The foreign policy scandal concerning Russian authorities' efforts to close two branch offices of the British Council happened to coincide with another event, which took place in Japan. A rather insignificant Japanese bureaucrat was arrested and charged with attempting to pass confidential documents concerning the activities of the prime minister's office to a Russian diplomat.

It is interesting to compare these two incidents. Japan's charges of espionage against the alleged spy were concrete, mentioning the day and time the act took place, as well as the payoff involved. In contrast, Russia has made only vague and contradictory accusations against the British Council, claiming on the one hand that the organization is not registered in accordance with Russian law, and on the other hand that it owes back taxes.

What's more, these vague charges were accompanied by much broader and quite bizarre allegations. We heard, for example, from a former chief of the undercover branch of the KGB's foreign intelligence division, Yury Drozdov, that Britain even plans to occupy Russian territory as far as the Urals.

As a true patriot, this particular allegation horrified me. But I would really like to find out one thing: Exactly who among the employees of the British Council was planning to occupy Russia and just how and when was this endeavor to take place? If Federal Security Service chief Nikolai Patrushev knows that such a plan existed but doesn't know who was behind it or when it was to take place, then he should be fired on the spot for gross incompetence. And how could a foreign organization that is fomenting plans to occupy a huge chunk of our territory get off with only a fine for back taxes?

In reality, Russia designs its foreign policy for the benefit of oil-trading company Gunvor, based in Switzerland. Gunvor, which sells a significant portion of Russia's oil exports, is owned in part by Gennady Timchenko, who has close ties to President Vladimir Putin.

Gunvor wants to derive one main benefit from Russia's foreign policy -- to increase the tensions in international relations so that oil prices rise. This explains Russia's continued willingness to defend rogue states and to keep all existing international conflicts active. This has become the trademark of Russian diplomacy. Although the Kremlin has achieved its goal of high oil prices during Putin's two terms, this victory comes at the expense of the country's prestige.

Putin believes that all world leaders are hypocrites when they criticize him because they act in the same way. Putin also feels that Western leaders treat him as if he were a drunk in a fancy restaurant; although they may not punch Putin in the face, they don't invite him to sit down at their dinner table either. He is clearly offended by the West's condescending attitude toward him and finds an outlet for his indignation by harassing the British Council, among other things.

Another very important aspect of the Gunvor matter is that the company's accounts are located in Western banks. Therefore, Putin doesn't want to provoke or anger the West to the point were it retaliates by exposing -- or freezing -- those bank accounts. Putin is smart enough to know how far to take his aggressive foreign policy. Thus, he would never dare to arrest British Council employees, for example -- as much as he would really like to do this in his heart of hearts -- or charge them with plotting to seize Russian territory. Instead, he settles on petty acts of harassment.

In this way, Putin's foreign policy reminds me of the bully in a communal apartment, who will happily spit in his neighbor's soup but will never do anything more serious that could provoke his fellow apartment dweller to call the police on him.

The Jamestown Foundation's Vladimir Socor, writing for the Eurasia Daily Monitor:

On January 21 the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) protected its reputation by eschewing the election of Mikhail Margelov as PACE president. Apparently, many members realized that PACE could have discredited itself irreparably by electing a Kremlin-affiliated figure as president of Europe’s leading democracy-promoting body. PACE elected the Catalan-Spanish Socialist, Lluís Maria de Puig, instead of Margelov, as president. In a parallel battle on January 21, Russia and its allies narrowly missed their goal to disinvite Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili from PACE’s upcoming debate on Georgia.

Margelov, an Arabic-studies graduate from Moscow State University (known at the time as a KGB training ground) was an instructor at the KGB Academy during the 1980s, according to his official Russian biography (Vedomosti, January 16). Margelov was Russian President Vladimir Putin’s liaison with international media during Russia’s 2000 presidential campaign and has served since 2001 continuously as the Russian Federation Council’s international affairs committee chairman. According to Margelov himself, Russia’s presidential administration and Ministry of Foreign Affairs had authorized his candidacy for president of PACE (Moskovskye novosti, September 14, 2007).

Moscow came very close to success through skillful manipulation of procedural rules by the Russian delegation and winning over some key conservative figures among PACE leaders. With minimal notice in Europe, the Strasbourg forum had become the scene of a Kremlin experiment with recruitment of political allies at the core of the European Right. PACE’s outgoing president Rene van der Linden, a conservative Christian-Democrat (European People’s Party – EPP) and the British Tory contingent in the European Democrats’ Group (EDG, an alliance of conservative parties somewhat to the right of EPP) were Margelov’s leading backers.

In a deal with PACE’s Tories, the delegation of the party of power United Russia had joined the EDG en masse, despite the inherent incompatibility; and, thanks to Tory leader David Wilshire, the numerically dominant United Russia had installed Margelov as EDG leader. Under PACE’s procedures, the five major political groupings take turns designating PACE’s president for a three-year term, thus practically guaranteeing the election’s result in advance. EDG’s turn came in January 2008 and they designated the “conservative” Margelov well ahead of the deadline, with vocal Tory support in Strasbourg and tacit acceptance by the Tory leadership in London (Denis MacShane, “Putin’s Tories,” The Spectator, January 10). Van der Linden, who developed a close relationship with Russia during 2007, was instrumental in arranging this succession scenario and marshaling the EPP behind Margelov’s presidential bid. Very few at PACE or elsewhere came out against this seemingly done deal.

However, Russia’s deeply flawed parliamentary elections in December changed the terms of debate at PACE. Many felt that they could no longer proceed automatically to install a proponent of the Kremlin’s “managed democracy” as PACE president in the immediate wake of Russia's electoral travesty. On January 10, leaders of PACE’s five political groupings met informally and agreed to modify the rotation procedure for electing the president. Under the new arrangement, the Socialists would on January 21 nominate their candidate for PACE president; EDG’s – that is, Margelov’s – turn would be postponed to the next rotation, and the president’s tenure would be abridged from three years to a one-year, once-renewable term.

Thus, Moscow had to accept a two-year postponement without a fight. However, it demanded and received promises that PACE would disinvite the reelected President Saakashvili from PACE’s January 24 debate on Georgia; that Putin would be invited to PACE in the spring; and that the debate on Russia’s recent parliamentary elections would be postponed to the summer – that is, to the brink of political oblivion. Putin finalized this informal agreement with the visiting Van der Linden on January 17 in Moscow (see EDM, January 21). Margelov duly desisted from running for president of PACE and de Puig was elected to that post without opposition on the session’s opening day, January 21. A defiant Wilshire is quoted as declaring that he could not congratulate de Puig because he had prepared the congratulatory text in Russian (Kommersant, January 22).

However, the next part of the bargain fell through, albeit by the narrowest of margins. Van der Linden’s and Margelov’s allies had for several weeks blocked the sending of the invitation to Saakashvili. Finally on January 21 the PACE Bureau (which consists of PACE’s vice presidents and the chairmen of committees and political groups) decided to invite Saakashvili, with 11 votes in favor and 10 against. The incoming president de Puig (hitherto leader of the Socialist grouping) and Matyas Eorsi of Hungary, leader of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats (ALDE, the liberal parties’ grouping) led the argument in favor of inviting Saakashvili.

Russian delegation leaders Margelov and Konstantin Kosachev and Tory leader Wilshire spearheaded the objections. Van der Linden’s ally, EPP leader Luc van der Brande, lined up behind them, despite assurances he had given to Christian-Democrat luminaries in EPP that he would not support Moscow on this issue. Apart from the familiar arguments against Georgia, they claimed that inviting Saakashvili ahead of Georgia’s parliamentary elections would amount to interfering in those elections in favor of the governing party (Interfax, RIA-Novosti, January 21, 22).

That argument looked contrived inasmuch as almost four months separate the January 24 debate on Georgia from the parliamentary elections in that country. Ultimately, the reports on van der Linden’s January 17 bargain with Putin in the Kremlin to disinvite Saakashvili (see EDM, January 21) shifted the balance in PACE’s Bureau, frustrating Moscow’s goal at the last moment. And, as predicted some months ago (see EDM, October 11, 22, November 2, 2007), the then-prevailing sentiment at PACE about the irreversibility of the deal made for a Russian presidency proved ultimately unfounded.

(1) Another Original LR Translation: Golts on Russia's "Military"

(2) Golts on the British Council Outrage, From the Russian Press

(3) EDITORIAL: Now We've Seen Everything

(4) Annals of the Neo-Soviet Crackdown on Journalism

(5) Chechens Flee the Horror of Putin's Russia in Droves

(6) Shades of Stalin in Neo-Soviet Russia

NOTE: In barbaric news that should surprise nobody, the Kremlin has opened criminal case against the only viable opposition candidate in the upcoming presidential elections, former prime minister Mikhail Kasyanov. A new low in the Kremlin's pathetic display of cowardice.

January 1, 2008 was supposed to be the Rubicon in the life of the Russian military. That was the day that the Federal Target Program (FTP) for the partial transition of the military to a contract basis was supposed to have been completed. The FTP originally came into existence as a compromise between the Kremlin and the military leadership. On the one hand, Putin had become convinced during the Second Chechen War that an army based on mass conscription was completely ineffective for the defense of the country. “To effectively respond to terrorists we would need to assemble a force of at least 65,000 men. But of all the military land forces, only 55,000 were in battle-ready condition,” recalled Putin, referring to the level of federal forces in 2006. “The Army has 1.4 million personnel, but none of them can fight. So they sent unseasoned kids into battle.”

At the same time, Putin could not come out in contradiction to the military leadership, who were organically incapable of framing the concept of an all-volunteer army. One must admit that our military leaders were exceptionally effective at waging war against reforms. In the process they proved very adroit at using stereotypes about the military that are deeply rooted in the minds of Russian government leaders. The Kremlin quickly grasped that transforming the military from a conscription-based system would cause military service to become a profession, and stop being simply the harshest form of taxation. And this would fundamentally change the relationship between the government and the people. Because contract service assumes mutual obligations and responsibilities, whereas conscription preserves the right of the government to use people as it sees fit without having to answer to anyone. Freeing people from such a levy is completely inconsistent with the basic concept of the government created by Vladimir Putin. Consequently, while no real reform was actually undertaken, it was decided that in the event of a local conflict a few dozen units and quick-reaction forces would be assembled using contract service members. In theory, these forces could be detached to conflict areas without the need for additional mobilizations or work-ups. At the time it was announced that fulfillment of this plan was directly connected with a reduction of the required term of service for conscripts to one year.

And now the Ministry of Defense has reported that the objectives of the FTP have been met. But wouldn’t you know it, right then, in the first few days of January, representatives from the organization “Soldiers’ Mothers of Saint Petersburg” announced that in the Totskiy garrison, located in Orenburgskaya Oblast, around thirty soldiers approaching the end of their required term of service were subjected to actual torture to force them to sign contracts to extend their service. The military authorities immediately accused the mothers of slander and promised to sue them.

Actually though, the forcing of signatures from contract soldiers should hardly come as a surprise. I suspect the leadership of the military is right now making feverish efforts to prevent the collapse of a classic pyramid scheme, which is exactly what the FTP has become.

We begin by noting that in the course of carrying out the FTP the Ministry of Defense has several times gotten the Kremlin to agree to reductions in its objectives. Recall that the plan originally called for the transitioning of 144,000 soldiers and senior enlisted to a contract basis. This number was then casually reduced to 133,000, then to 121,000. And now, lo and behold, reporting on the successful completion of the plan, they say that there are now 100,000 contract soldiers. True, the head of the mobilization command of the general staff, General Vasiliy Smirnov tells us that in the quick reaction forces there is a 20-percent “vacancy rate” in soldier and senior enlisted positions. If that is so, however, then there can be no talk of the FTP having been fulfilled. Just as there can be no talk of a quick reaction force where one-fifth of its complement is missing.

At the same time, Smirnov claims that the missing contract soldiers will be “additionally acquired” in the first few months of 2008. It is entirely possible that the short-time soldiers at the Totskiy garrison came, as they say, up for release just as their commanders were receiving an order to secure, by whatever means necessary, the required number of contract enlistments.

On the other hand, there is absolutely no reason for believing any of the figures put out by the leadership of the military related to the FTP. Because they are never consistent. Embarking in the FTP, the military leadership informed us that at that time the army already had 155,000 contract soldiers, and now they claim that this number has grown to 206,000. At the same time, there has been no mention of a massive reduction in the number of contract positions in the regular army. Therefore their total number has increased not by 100,000, but by only 50,000 men.

But the issue is not only in the shortfall in the number of military professionals. Even worse is the situation with their quality. In between the triumphant reports, the truth about their true condition comes rupturing out. For example, the senior commander of Ground Forces, General Aleksey Maslov acknowledges: “For some reason, in the level of their preparedness the contract soldiers are not much better than military units composed of draftees.” And the chief military prosecutor noted at the end of the year a sharp growth in crime among the contract soldiers - twenty-five percent higher compared to 2006. No surprise here: ensnared into contract units, short-term soldiers leave at the first opportunity, since they sincerely cannot see why in the heck they should stay another year.

And here is why the figures do not add up. For exactly the reason that the figures from any organizer of a pyramid scheme will not add up. In private conversation, senior military leaders admit: in recent years they have hardly succeeded in bringing in as many new recruits as those that have left the army. It would appear that the number of military service members in contract units hovers somewhere around 50,000.

Of course it is understood that at the moment this program is completed the entire pyramid will collapse. But the military leadership here skips along like any financial manipulator, and simply starts up a new swindle. It announces that a new plan has been prepared, as a result of which in 2009-2011 all senior enlisted in the military, including all shipboard crew in the Navy - a total of 87,000 positions - will be on a contract basis.

Other Russia translates Alexander Golts from the pages of Yezhedevny Zhurnal:

Russia this week upheld another shining foreign policy victory: The work of regional branches of the British Council in St. Petersburg and Yekaterinburg was suspended. These brazen British, who have been soiling Russia for more than just the past century, reckoned on defending themselves with certain arrangements, like the 1994 bilateral agreement on cooperation in the domains of culture, science and education. Since in accord with [the agreement], Moscow pledged (oh, those “accursed 90s”) to “foster on its territory the opening of centres of culture, education and information of the opposite side,” and “provide every assistance to such centres.” Those shysters from foggy Albion were also counting on the fact that the British Council in Russia holds the status of a cultural branch of the embassy, and that all diplomatic privileged are extended to it. They were calculating, no doubt, that our mighty state would be proving somewhere, that the activities of British Council employees were illegal.

The good people studied our history poorly. Otherwise, they would have known how [Count Alexander von] Benckendorf rebuked the unfortunate [Baron Anton Antonovich] Delvig, who risked making reference to the law: “Laws are written for the subjects, and not for the authorities, and you don’t have the right to refer to them or use them to excuse yourself in your explanations with me.” And [the laws] are not strong in the ideology of the present-day Russian government. Otherwise the [students] would remember how one of Benckendorf’s successors explained the essence of “sovereign democracy” a few years back: “We must be the masters in our own country.” Not the law, not the people –THEM. And that’s why [the authorities] can demonstrate their truth by having “prophylactic talks” with Russian citizens working at the British Council, or by arresting Stephen Kinnock, who heads the St. Petersburg branch, for driving under the influence.

In truth, this whole comical war with the British Council—an organization called to serve the dissemination of the English language [and] knowledge of Great Britain’s culture—very clearly demonstrates the fundamental differences between the political cultures of the two countries.

More than a year ago, even before [Alexander] Litvinenko’s poisoning, when the Kremlin was taking pleasure in badgering the British ambassador with the help of the Nashi [youth group], one of Russia’s political analysts couldn’t bear it and asked a question: why don’t the British respond appropriately. Why not establish an “Ours” movement (preferably out of the most die-hard Liverpool [Football Club] fans”) and establish a merry existence for the Russian ambassador. Any why not, at present, make use of the circumstance that the children, wives and mistresses of Russia’s highest-[ranking] civil servants permanently reside in the United Kingdom? A Scotland Yard special division, in collaboration with MI-5 could easily discover a couple cartridges, or a baggie with heroin on family-members of some ardent British detractor. Under an “eye for an eye” logic, they would entirely have the right—remember, that the Stephen Kinnock arrested in St. Petersburg is the son of Neil Kinnock, the former head of the [British] Labour [Party].

Finally, why don’t they use the bank accounts of Russian citizens as a pressure lever. Well, why not review them for money laundering? And block them for the period of examination.

In a word, a lot of things could be contrived. And all that would remain would be to marvel at the desperation of Russia’s higher-ups, who had turned their loved ones into natural hostages on enemy terrain. But that’s just it, what the representatives of the so-called Russian elite understand perfectly well is that on the territory of the United Kingdom, nothing will endanger their families or even their money. For the simple reason, that even now, as in Benckendorf’s times and even earlier, the authorities in that country serve the laws, and not the other way around. The court there isn’t [like] Basmanny. And it doesn’t hand out arrest warrants on the prime minister’s command. And it allows extradition only in the event if a person’s guilt is proven.

And Russia’s patriotic superiors are perfectly aware of this. They prefer to keep their families in England, as at any moment, their close ones could become hostages in their native land.

Robert Amsterdam offers a translation of another Russian view of the crisis.