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Sunday, September 17, 2006

The Sunday Funnies





The story of Ivan Itchybuttock

CLICK HERE to have your mind read by the deviously inscrutable Russian Magic Square (thanks to RussianEnglish).

More Truth is Funnier than Fiction
Soviet Russians Duped into Planting a Living Swastika


The New York Times reports:

The forest stands overhead in the dusty mountain air, a dense composition of fir trees on a slope, planted by labor gangs decades ago. Its right angles are sharp and clear, forming a square cross with an upraised arm on one side and a turned-down arm on the other. Viewed from this remote village, the effect strongly suggests a living swastika, a huge and chilling symbol, out of place and time.

This is the so-called Eki Naryn swastika, a man-made arrangement of trees near the edge of the Himalayas. It is at least 60 years old, according to the region’s forestry service, and roughly 600 feet across. Legend has it that German prisoners of war, pressed into forestry duty after World War II, duped their Soviet guards and planted rows of seedlings in the shape of the emblem Hitler had chosen as his own.

More than 20 years later, the trees rose tall enough to be visible from the village beneath. Only then did the swastika appear, a time-delayed act of defiance by vanquished soldiers marooned in a corner of Stalin’s Soviet Union. For all the tidiness of legend, however, the tale is not quite true. The provenance of these trees presents a more complicated mystery than a silent subterfuge in a forgotten prison camp. The theory about the prisoners has survived for years, in part because about 1.3 million German soldiers have been missing in the former Soviet Union since the war, according to the German Red Cross. Many were forced to work. They mined uranium and coal, toiled on farms, erected buildings and built roads, railways and canals.

As many as 30,000 of them were sent to Central Asia, the German Red Cross says. The symmetry in the tree line, evidence of their defiance, by this telling, may be the Third Reich’s only practical joke. But aside from the presence of the tree formation itself, unraveling the origins of the lost Nazis’ presumed insubordination is a chore undercut by time. History has become malleable, a yarn by turns sinister, wry, clever and Soviet. It is also warped by errors, a cover-up, competing theories and lies. Yedil Musayev, a teacher, said the trees were planted in the 1940’s by Kyrgyz laborers from the sprawling Lenin Collective Farm, which managed the region’s high plateau. The farm’s managers consisted of Russians and Europeans, he said, sent to distant posts to battle illiteracy and improve efficiency.

Unbeknownst to the Kyrgyz laborers, he said, their forestry supervisor was an ethnic German who had been exiled to the east, as were many Germans during the war. He was a Nazi sympathizer, Mr. Musayev said. The forest was his design

Sultanbek Kandibayev, director of the regional forestry service, gave a different version, saying the trees were planted in 1953, after Stalin’s death, under the supervision of a woman who was a German nationalist.

Ulambek Sheripov, a deputy director, added detail, saying the woman hid her plans by having the slope planted a patch at a time. But he disagreed with his director about when the plantings occurred, saying a survey in 1991 estimated the trees were 50 years old at the time, meaning they were most likely planted before 1953.

Harbinger of Terror: Russian Market Down Over 6% in 10 Days


As RTS data shows above, the Russian stock market has taken yet another nosedive. After having held steady at 1650 for nearly two weeks, the RTS Index plunged 100 points to 1550 over the last ten days, and in fact got a bit below that level before recovering. As the price of oil has fallen and the price of gas at the American pump dropped significantly, the Russian stock market, wholly dependent on oil, has suffered. Without oil, there is no real value in the Russian market at all. In other words, it is directly in the interests of investors in the Russian stock market to see turmoil in the Middle East, jacking up oil prices and protecting their investments. Thus, we should not be surprised to see Russia's corporatist Kremlin fomenting that turmoil by giving diplomatic cover to Iran while supplying them nuclear technology and by supporting the Hezbollah and Hamas terrorist organizations. Could Russia be supporting terrorist activity in Iraq? We can't be sure yet, but Russia not only opposed the Iraq invasion it provided U.S. military secrets to Sadaam while it was in progress, costing American lives. This is the signal hallmark of the New Cold War. We should not be surprised to see new outbreaks of instability and terror in the Middle East as the Russian market continues to plunge.

Annals of Cold War II: Felgenhauer on Neo-Soviet Russia's Violation of the Nuclear Arms Accords

Writing for the Jamestown Foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor, the brilliant Pavel Felgenhaur exposes Neo-Soviet Russia backsliding on the nuclear arms accords.

On Sunday September 10, during a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin aboard the Baltic Fleet's flagship, the destroyer Nastoychivy, at the naval base Baltiysk, Kaliningrad, Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov made public that Russia has apparently abrogated a major nuclear arms control agreement.

During the meeting, Ivanov reported to the president the successful test launch of two submarine-based ICBMs: one from the Pacific Ocean by nuclear sub Svyatoi Georgy Pobedonosets, the other from the North Pole by the Yekaterinburg nuclear sub. Both launches were aimed at a test range in Arkhangelsk region, and Ivanov reported that the ICBM warheads had successfully hit their targets (Interfax, September 10).According to Ivanov, the launch from the North Pole area was the first of its kind in 11 years. It is clear that this test launch imitated an attack from U.S. territory and that the Russian Navy has resumed Cold War training exercises that were previously abandoned.

Then came the real sensation: Putin asked how many Russian nuclear subs were at sea. Ivanov reported: "Today, there are eight nuclear-powered submarines at sea on combat patrols. Five of them are strategic and three are multipurpose, but each of them has nuclear arms aboard" (Interfax, September 10). Ivanov made the statement and then repeated it once again unequivocally, as broadcast the same day by Russian government’s Rossiya television channel: "The subs have different tasks -- some are armed with ICBMs, others are multipurpose -- but each of them has nuclear weapons aboard."

Ivanov's statement is highly significant, because under existing agreements it is illegal for Russia to deploy non-strategic nuclear weapons on board attack (multipurpose) subs.On September 27, 1991, U.S. President George H.W. Bush announced drastic cuts in non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons and invited the Soviet Union to follow his lead. Ten days later Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev agreed to do the same. In January 1992, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian President Boris Yeltsin officially committed Russia to continue tactical nuclear disarmament.

The non-strategic arms limitation agreements required the total destruction of all nuclear artillery shells, tactical land-based missile warheads, and nuclear land mines. They also mandated the partial destruction of anti-missile and anti-aircraft defense missile warheads, non-strategic naval nuclear weapons, and Air Force and Naval Air Force bombs. All the nuclear weapons left after the partial destruction and, in particular, all non-strategic naval weapons were to be detached from delivery systems, taken off ships and subs, and placed in centralized storage facilities away from naval and other military bases. The only exceptions were Air Force tactical bombs that were allowed to be deployed at storage facilities near air bases (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Nuclear Status Report, www.ceip.org).

Great Britain later joined Russia and the United States in removing non-strategic nuclear weapons from ships and subs. All cuts of tactical nukes were to be completed by the end of 2000, and only strategic ICBM warheads could be deployed at sea. On April 25, 2000, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov (now secretary of the Russian Security Council) told the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in New York that Russia had "practically completed cuts" in compliance with its nuclear non-strategic obligations.The tactical nuclear limitation agreements are not a formal treaty, and no compliance verification mechanism ever existed. Despite statements to the contrary, questions about Russian compliance with non-strategic nuclear disarmament have been raised.

Unlike U.S. naval-based, long-range cruise missiles, their Russian (Soviet) equivalents -- the Granat and Granit -- were not designed or ever tested to carry conventional warheads. Still Russian attack subs continued to deploy these missiles at sea, which did not make sense if only their nuclear tips continued to be in place despite official pledges.However, now the time for speculation is over. Ivanov’s statement, made in front of reporters and President Putin reveals unequivocally that Russian attack subs are being deployed "on combat patrols" against NATO ships with battle-ready non-strategic nukes onboard.

Russia is clearly cheating now and may have been cheating on its signed tactical nuclear arms control promises all along.Ivanov’s de facto abrogation of the non-strategic arms limitation agreement comes at a time when military-to-military relations with the West are at an all time low. Last week prearranged peacekeeping and anti-terrorist military exercises that were scheduled to take place this month in Nizhny Novgorod oblast (U.S.-Russian) and Pskov oblast (NATO-Russian) were suddenly cancelled. Ivanov’s announcement of the battlefield redeployment of non-strategic nukes was hardly a simple slip of the tongue. As the incumbent regime in Russia is preparing for parliamentary elections next year and presidential ones in 2008, anti-NATO and anti-American rhetoric is being supplemented by official anti-Western military actions.

The collapse of the existing tactical nuclear limitation regime is not in Russia’s national interests, since the United States and Great Britain have the capability to deploy tens of times more naval nuclear long-range cruise missiles and other non-strategic nukes than does Russia. But it would seem that the Kremlin is still ready to risk drastically worsening relations. Increased military tension may facilitate a nationalistic anti-U.S., anti-NATO surge of public opinion in Russia that might help carry someone like Ivanov (or whomever Putin chooses) into the Kremlin as the new president.

For more detail, click here.

Russia, Third World Nation, Humiliates Disabled British Lord

Coventry reports:

STRATFORD district councillor Sir William Lawrence has slated Russia's provisionfor disabled people as "absolutely Third World" after coming a cropper during a visit to Moscow. Sir William, who is also a governor at the Royal Shakespeare Theatre, was visiting the country in his capacity as national chairman of the British Toilet Association, which seeks to raise the standards of public loos. Sir William, who needs to use a wheelchair after suffering polio as a child, suffered a fall at the Holiday Inn, in which he damaged his knee. He said he was then carried through Moscow Airport on a makeshift "stretcher". He said: "Somebody got the bright idea of getting a fork-lift truck and physically lifting the ambulance up to the plane doors and getting me in that way. They then started dragging me across the floor of the plane on a metal sheet nailed to two bits of wood. Flight operator Lufthansa has pledged to investigate the matter. Sir William, who is now recovering in Warwick Hospital, said: "The reality is that Moscow is absolutely Third World when it comes to the disabled."

La Russophobe has already reported how the Toilet Conference revealed a first indication of Rusisa's third-world status, the fact that "about a third of Russian homes still have an outhouse. And as for public toilets, port-a-potties are state of the art. Russia has few public restrooms." You can add into the mix sewage treatment plants, one of which exploded yesterday outside Moscow killing at least one person and depriving the countryside of water services.

Now we have a second indication from the Conference in Russia's barbaric treatment of the disabled. Shall we tick of some more? Let's:

#3 -- Orphanages & Mental Institutions

#4-- AIDS/Homosexual policy & Medical Care & Adult Lifespan

#5-- Elections

#6 -- Per Capita GDP

#7 -- Environmental Policy

#8 -- Military Conscription

#9 -- Roads & Public Buses

#10 -- Official Corruption

When we review our list, we must ask what in what categories Russia is NOT a third-world state. Here the list is shorter: Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and High Culture (opera, ballet, literature, etc.). Now, gentle reader, you decide which list outweighs the other.

Saturday, September 16, 2006

Madonna's Russia Tour (1 Gig) Ends in Disastrous, Humiliating Failure for Russia

The Daily Mirror reports that Madonna's fans were scared off by outrageous ticket prices and those who showed up at her first-ever Moscow concert were too scared to dance, making the concert a total failure and blinding humiliation for Russia. Chechens 1, Putin 0.

MADONNA played the most incredible concert ever in Moscow - with 10,000 soldiers and riot police armed to the teeth in the audience.

Following mafia kidnap fears and warnings of Chechen terrorist attacks thousands of police and army cadets were out in force, bristling with weaponry, at her Russian gig. So it was little wonder her fans found it hard to get in the party mood - many punters said they found the huge police presence menacing and intimidating.

One fan told us: "There was very little atmosphere or dancing and Madonna was really struggling to get the crowd going Most events have a security presence but this did seem to be extraordinary.

"I was at the G8 summit and the security was comparable. Everywhere you looked there was a ring of security guards. It did make it hard to dance when you're standing beside a guy in a uniform."

Madonna was playing the Luzhniki Stadium, and it must have been odd looking out into the crowd and seeing nearly as many police as punters.

The concert began with the 48-year-old descending from the roof in riding gear shouting: "Hello Russia! Ladies and gentlemen, thanks for coming."

The 55,000 capacity venue wasn't full - partly because tickets for the Confessions tour cost up to £500, nearly two and a half times a monthly Muscovite wage.

And at least a third of the seats were empty.

Sniffer dogs, explosives experts and soldiers from the Dzerzhinsky special task force were on hand while helicopters circled the stadium on Tuesday night.

Queues grew as every guest had to go through a metal detector and have their bags checked.

The world's biggest-selling female artist was scheduled to perform in a park close to Moscow State University and more than 35,000 tickets were sold within days of becoming available.

But police demanded a change of venue two weeks ago amid fears that as many as 200,000 people could gatecrash one of the biggest showbiz events in Russia this year.

Madge has also had criticism from church chiefs and Russian Orthodox leaders demanded she ditch religious imagery from her act.

One fan moaned later: "It was closer to a Lionel Richie concert than a satanic orgy."

Maybe Russia's new song should be, sung to the tune of "New York, New York" something like "If you can't fail there, you can't fail anywhere . . ."

Postcards from the Land of the Midnight Gun

CNN reports:

MOSCOW, Russia (Reuters) -- Gunmen have shot and killed a senior Russian central banker who strove to stamp out money laundering in one of the most high profile suspected contract killings since Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000.

There have been dozens of contract assassinations since the fall of communism in 1991 but the murder of 41-year-old Andrei Kozlov, the Central Bank's first deputy chairman, has jolted Russia's business and political community which had begun to enjoy a higher degree of safety and stability.

The following is a list of five of the highest profile contract killings in Russia since 1991:

March 1995 - Gunmen kill Vladislav Listyev, the charismatic anchorman of a highly popular news talk show. The attack is linked to opponents of an advertising ban he had proposed for a new version of Russia's main television channel.

November 1998 - Galina Starovoitova, a leading liberal deputy and human rights campaigner, is shot dead by gunmen at her apartment building in St Petersburg.

October 2002 - Valentin Tsvetkov, governor of the Magadan region in Russia's far east, is shot dead in central Moscow. He had been trying to crack down on rampant crime in his Pacific region's gold and oil industries.

July 2004 - Gunmen shoot dead Paul Klebnikov, a U.S. citizen and editor of Forbes's Russian magazine, outside his Moscow office. Klebnikov had written at length about corruption in Russia and Forbes had published a list of Russia's richest people.

October 2005 - The former head of a bank that had its license revoked for suspected money laundering and triggered a general banking crisis in Russia, Alexander Slesarev, is gunned down in his car with his daughter and wife.

In Russia, Written Contracts are not Worth the Paper they are Printed on

The Houston Chronicle reports that Russia is trying to cheat Exxon as part of its latest assault on property rights:

Exxon Mobil Corp. on Thursday warned Russia to honor a decade-old production-sharing agreement to develop the Sakhalin-1 oil and gas block or risk spooking other foreign investors in the country.

The statement comes as Russia and Irving-based Exxon Mobil squabble over whether the company has automatic rights to develop newly discovered reserves around existing deposits in the Sakhalin-1 project.

Russia plans to auction off the new deposits, while Exxon Mobil believes its license territory should be automatically enlarged to include them. Exxon Mobil said it was in talks with the Russian government to resolve the issue.

But Exxon Mobil said that any resolution should account for the rights of consortium members and strictly comply with the Sakhalin-1 agreement and Russian laws.

Analysts have said the Kremlin — which had already alarmed foreign investors with its dogged pursuit of oil company Yukos for back taxes — is showing signs of increasing unhappiness with major projects controlled by foreign investors.

Weeks of pressure by Moscow on the rival Sakhalin-2, led by Royal Dutch Shell, culminated this week with Russia's environment watchdog saying it had asked a court to recognize that the scheme did not comply with ecological rules. Work would have to stop at that project if the suit is successful.

Exxon Mobil meanwhile said it had started the process of exporting oil from Sakhalin-1 on schedule, marking a major milestone for the closely watched project.

That met Exxon Mobil's own forecast of exports starting in August, despite some reports earlier in the summer that they could be delayed to October.

Sakhalin-1 is the biggest new oil find in the area in many years and is expected to boost supply in a tightly stretched global market. It could help ease high crude prices and displace sales of competing African and Mediterranean crude into Asia.

First oil from Sakhalin-1 began flowing into the export system on Aug. 29, and the initial tanker will begin loading at the newly built DeKastri terminal this month, Exxon Mobil said.

Oil production from the project should ramp up to a peak rate of 250,000 barrels a day by the end of 2006, it said.

Annals of Cold War II: U.S. Senate Condemns Neo-Soviet Repression by Unanimous Consent

On July 25, 2006, the United States Senate passed a resolution by unanimous consent condemning the Russian government for failing to control brutal violence against Russian journalists. The resolution was sponsored by Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton of New York. It read:

Whereas, on July 9, 2004, United States journalist Paul Klebnikov was murdered by gunmen as he exited the Moscow offices of Forbes Magazine;

Whereas no person has been convicted of any offense in connection with the murder of Mr. Klebnikov;

Whereas Mr. Klebnikov is survived by his wife Helen and his 3 young children;

Whereas 12 journalists have been murdered in the Russian Federation since 2000 and Mr. Klebnikov was the first and only citizen of the United States among those journalists;

Whereas the Office of the Russian Prosecutor General arrested and tried Musa Vahaev and Kazbek Dukzov for the murder of Mr. Klebnikov;

Whereas Musa Vahaev and Kazbek Dukzov were acquitted on May 5, 2006, of the charges of murdering Mr. Klebnikov;

Whereas the Government of Russia has stated that the murder of Mr. Klebnikov was ordered by Khozh-Akhmed Nukhayev, a fugitive Chechen criminal gang leader, but has not publicly released any evidence of the complicity of Mr. Nukhayev;

Whereas it remains unclear who ordered the murder of Mr. Klebnikov or if any party will be convicted of that crime;

Whereas the attorneys that represented the Klebnikov family have alleged that numerous procedural violations occurred during the trial;

Whereas a group of investigative journalists from the United States has launched an independent inquiry into the death of Mr. Klebnikov;

Whereas the 2005 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices published by the Department of State indicated that the Government of Russia had continued to weaken the independence and freedom of expression of the media industry of Russia, particularly among the major national television networks and regional media outlets of that country; and

Whereas, on June 4, 2006, President Putin told a conference of the World Association of Newspapers that ``A progressive state requires a free press.'': Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the Senate--

(1) condemns--
(A) the murder of United States journalist Paul Klebnikov on July 9, 2004, in Moscow; and
(B) the murders of other members of the media in the Russian Federation;
(2) commends the Office of the Russian Prosecutor General for its continuing investigation of the murder of Mr. Klebnikov;
(3) urges the Government of Russia--
(A) to continue its inquiries to determine all parties involved in the murder of Mr. Klebnikov; and
(B) to bring those parties responsible for the murder of Mr. Klebnikov to justice;
(4) urges the Government of Russia to accept offers of assistance with the investigation of the murder of Mr. Klebnikov from--
(A) the United States; and
(B) other concerned governments;
(5) urges the Government of Russia, upon request, to extend appropriate assistance to investigative journalists who have started to conduct independent inquiries relating to the death of Mr. Klebnikov, to the extent that such assistance conforms with the privacy safeguards and the laws of Russia; and
(6) urges the Government of Russia to take appropriate action to protect the independence and freedom of--
(A) the media of Russia; and
(B) all visiting members of the media.

The Dubrovka Coverup














Which is worse: (a) The terrorist attack by Islamic radicals on the Dubrovka theater; (b) the mass-murder of those inside by the Kremlin, or (c) the Kremlin's shamless attempt to bury the whole matter in the aftermath? You decide. The Times of London reports:


The buried truth
Stefanie Marsh

Our correspondent meets families fighting the apparatus of the Russian state to find out why 129 hostages died in the 2002 Moscow theatre siege

“I asked to see the body. It was covered in a blue sheet. Only her face and her fingers were visible. I was not allowed to inspect her. I asked to straighten out the hair covering her face. I noticed a large swelling beneath her nose, also that her hands were almost black and hugely bloated.”

This is Dmitri Milovidov, a middle-aged Muscovite, describing the body of his 14-year-old daughter Nina, discovered two days after her death. If we are to take Vladimir Putin’s word for it, Nina died as a result of “dehydration, chronic disease or the very fact that she had been confined in the building” during the stand-off between Chechen terrorists and the Russian security services at the Dubrovka theatre in Moscow, which came to a sudden and messy end on October 26, 2002.

Not the least remarkable thing about Dmitri Milovidov’s story is the fact that it happened on October 28. That is to say: 48 hours after having been reassured that there had been no fatalities among the hostages; 46 hours after having been told that fatalities had occurred but that there were no children among them; 31 hours after having been notified of a government helpline for frantic relatives, a number which, when dialled, was never answered; and 24 hours after Dmitri and his wife, Olga, bewildered by the official silence, began their long search for their daughter, at first through the chaotic hospitals of the capital and then, as hope drained, through its morgues. “I was feeling Nina’s existence until 10am on the 26th,” Olga told me. “At 10am there was no connection with my daughter. I can’t prove that’s when she died, but that’s what I felt.”

The story of the Moscow theatre siege is well known, up to a point. On October 23, 2002, during a packed performance of the Russian musical Nord Ost, around 40 armed Chechen terrorists gained access to the Dubrovka theatre. The 800 or so audience members and theatre staff were held hostage while the notoriously brutal terrorists demanded the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya. The world’s gaze swivelled on to the Dubrovka. On that mythical level where acts of violence gain or fail to gain the world’s attention, the audacity of the collision engineered by the terrorists — between the blithe metropolitan theatregoers and the hardest edge of ultra-nationalism — captivated the global media.

Three hostages were killed, probably inadvertently: 200 other hostages were released during negotiations. Unlike at Beslan two years later, the siege of the Dubrovka wasn’t a slaughterhouse. But at around 5am on the 26th, the state security forces began to pump an opiate-based gas through the theatre’s air vents. The Russian Government has refused to name the gas, but medical experts believe it was fentanyl. In Britain fentanyl is used primarily in intensive care wards as an analgesic: in excess it can be fatal. It disarmed the terrorists, certainly, and most probably killed some of them: those who weren’t fatally poisoned were shot dead when the theatre was subsequently stormed. What Dmitri and Olga want to know is this: what did the gas do to the hostages?

And here we come up against the first of many riddles and contradictions that surround the events of October 26. Although a plaque recently erected outside the Dubrovka numbers 129 dead among the former hostages, officially none of them was killed by gas. Shortly after the building was stormed, Russia’s health minister at the time stated: “Similar preparations are widely used in medical practice and as such cannot cause a lethal outcome.”

Mr Putin vigorously denied any connection between the gas and the subsequent fatalities: “Those people did not die because of the effects of the gas, for the gas is not harmful,” he emphasised in an interview with American journalists in 2003. “And we can say that none of the hostages were injured in the course of the operation.”

The 26th was a terrible day for the Milovidovs, followed by a terrible night, and then another terrible day among thousands of other desperate relatives (there were still at least 600 hostages inside the theatre when the security services stormed it) and at the end of it all there was Nina, her face and hands swollen as if she had choked, her internal organs “ flooded with liquid” as a doctor confided to them, and on her death certificate, along with Time of Death and Place of Death, was a simple entry next to Cause of Death: “Terrorism”.

“I learnt about Sasha’s death on the radio on 27 October 2002. I learned about the circumstances of her death, that she was crushed while being taken to hospital by bus, later on from the press and people who were present during formal identification.” Svetlana Gubareva
It isn’t wholly inaccurate to say that terrorism killed Nina Milovidova, Sasha Gubareva and the other 127 victims. But terrorists didn’t. A Kremlin investigation into the hostages’ deaths has been quietly shelved. The gassing and subsequent storming of the Dubrovka theatre was a success: all the terrorists were killed there and then. And it was also a failure: by late on the 28th more than 100 hostages had died, directly or indirectly as a result of “terrorism”.

Compensation has been derisory: the coffins provided for the dead were so undersized that one victim’s mother broke one trying to bend her son’s rigid corpse into it. And that, in Russian life, would tend to be that, a country which, by official reckoning, suffered only 41 casualties from the Chernobyl disaster; a country where, 24 hours after the Kursk nuclear missile submarine sank with the loss of 118 lives, Mr Putin was photographed hosting a barbecue on holiday.When, subsequently, a mother of one of the men killed in the disaster shouted abuse at a senior minister on television, she was forcibly sedated. In Russia you don’t tend to respond to calamity by devoting four years of your life to pestering the government for answers.

But four years after the theatre siege a group of survivors and relatives called Nord Ost, has presented a case against the Russian Government at the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. Crucial to its case is a book, published just in time for the St Petersburg G8 summit, also entitled Nord Ost: a 192-page volume of testimonies from survivors, relatives, ambulance drivers, doctors, journalists and anyone who witnessed the theatre seige. The book, although harrowing, doesn’t simply mourn the victims: it is a reconstruction. The testimonies, taken together, build a case against the Russian Government. Even five years ago, such a campaign was inconceivable.

Here are some of its grim highlights. Witnesses recall how, once the theatre was stormed, bodies were piled up on the pavement outside, before being loaded into ordinary buses — the living, in the instance of one 13-year-old girl, crushed to death beneath the dead. It quotes an ambulance driver, Dmitri, who watched as medically untrained and panic-stricken policemen haphazardly injected survivors, sometimes repeatedly, with antidote; how, in other cases, lack of antidote and plain ignorance led to others being left to die on hospital floors. Several witnesses describe seeing hostages emerge from the building, their skin sickly green and blue. They conjecture that acutely sick former hostages were prematurely discharged from hospital so as not to create a scandal, and that their medical documents were falsified. Survivors describe their ensuing and still unexplained kidney, heart, breathing and memory problems. One woman, four months pregnant at the time of the crisis, later gave birth to a disabled child: was there a connection? She wants to know.

The abiding impression is of the collapse of state competence in the face of a self-inflicted calamity. It’s thought that several hostages died of asphyxiation, having been left on their backs on the pavement. If the Russian Government had wanted to broadcast the statement “The destruction of our enemies is more important than the protection our citizens”, it could not have done so more clearly.

Naturally the viewpoint of most contributors to the book is skewed against the Government. After a while the reader begins to hunger for the other side of the story — and yet there isn’t one. Three weeks after The Times contacted the Kremlin for a response there has been only silence. A member of the British Embassy staff in Moscow who witnessed the evacuation scene at first hand told me: “The security services made a very calculated decision to pump that building full of synthetic narcotic morphine. But there was simply no preparation for what would happen next: there was no fleet of ambulances; none of the hospitals had been notified; bodies, alive and dead, were being dragged along the street by their hands, there were grazes on their backs from this. Many people died needlessly. It was botched. In a country like Britain there is no doubt in my mind that it would have brought down the government.”

“The hostages were already lying on the floor outside the theatre. There was a box of syringes and antidote capsules. Some man cried out, ‘Begin injecting!’ We began opening up packaging and collecting syringes. Injections were given to hostages both by those who knew and who did not know how to give them: special forces soldiers, city rescue workers, the Ministry of Emergency Situations (MChS) soldiers, even militiamen from the cordon. Nobody took notes about injections administered: two, three injections were given. And these are lethal doses. The chaos was unimaginable.”

In a run-down café in a Moscow suburb I meet Tatiana Karpova, her enormous squat frame wedged between those of her two sons, Nick and Ivan, who sit like respectful bouncers on either side of their mother while she talks and smokes and jabs the smouldering point of her slimline cigarette into the air for emphasis. Her third son, Sasha, died during the theatre siege, or so she thought until she somehow she got her hands on a note written by the driver of the ambulance in which Sasha had died. It read: Time of Death: 12.45pm. Place of Death: This ambulance. “Seven hours after the theatre was stormed,” she rages angrily at me. “And this is what they call a ‘brilliant military operation’.”

Karpova used to be a teacher and one can well imagine the effect her fierce rhetoric might have had on her students. Now, as the driving force behind Nord Ost, the woman who personally collated the information in the booklet, scraped together the money to have it published and then had it delivered to each of the G8 embassies, she is an intimidating, uninterruptible presence, even, one guesses, to the officials who tell her to wind up her peaceful demonstrations or try to talk her out of publishing controversial booklets.

She tells me that Sasha was a talented musician, the translator of the musical Chicago into Russian, and how, on hearing of his death, the American Embassy sent a letter of condolence and how she received nothing from her own Government. “Between 1998 and 2006 there have been 16 terrorist acts and after every terrorist act the government tries to cover it up,” she says. “They hoped the same would happen after Nord Ost. They didn’t expect that the people would be brought together by this tragedy.”

But in post-Soviet Russia that is just what happened. And these were people reeling from a whole series of events, not just Nord Ost. Karpova’s organisation now includes survivors of all sorts of tragedies of the old Soviet Union: the explosion in a group of Moscow flats in 1999; another bomb attack, this time in the Moscow Underground in 2004; when Chechen terrorists bribed their way on to two planes at a Moscow airport before blowing them up, Karpova was there; Beslan; even the families of soldiers killed through maltreatment in Russia’s armed forces are in touch with Karpova.

Last month she attended the second anniversary of the crash of one of the planes and flew out to Beslan to mark the second anniversary of the tragedy. Next month she is organising a memorial ceremony at Dubrovka. “Normal people are supporting us,” she says proudly. “The Government doesn’t understand. They are rich, they don’t understand us poor. Dubrovka wasn’t an operation to save hostages. It was an operation to save the reputation of the state. Many people don’t realise that the state is actively keeping secrets. You have to understand that when you lose your family and nobody says anything, you want to die. A lot of people just wanted to die. They got no support, nothing.”

Under her arm Karpova carries a lever arch file with the medical histories of 34 former hostages: 14 of them are now categorised as invalids. She can’t know everything, she says. Of course there are people who wanted to put the past behind them. And she doesn’t know for sure if there’s a correlation between that gas and what’s happened to these invalids, but they’re sick nonetheless, with kidney problems and memory loss. Karpova has obtained 117 of the official post-mortem reports: 68 of these contain the phrase “No medical help given”. Another 12 of the survivors have totally or partially lost their hearing. Why?

“The attendants seized the dead body by its hands and legs and carried it to a special room. I saw how this young woman, thought to be dead, waggled her head. ‘She’s alive!’ said a male nurse, crossing himself.” Yuri Snegiryov

A day later, in another run-down Moscow café, Alexander Shalmov turns up to meet me. He wears a pinstripe suit, although since the siege he is practically unemployable. Shulmov miraculously survived the siege with both his son and wife, but he is not well. “I do not feel like a father,” he says. “I feel like a ghost.” Perhaps the most terrifying part of what Shalmov has to say is about what he experienced when he first came to after the siege. His theory is that there were two gases pumped into the building. “I remember a strange atmosphere for several hours before we were knocked out,” he says. “I think we must have been sedated because there was a feeling of nobody being afraid. Then I remember seeing what looked like dust coming through the air vents. I remember trying to cover my son’s nose and mouth with cloth, nothing more.”

Alexander was unconscious for 15 hours. When he came to the first thing he saw was a clock on the wall. He became aware of an overwhelming animal terror. “I’ve been put under general anaesthetic before and I know how it feels to come out of that: a sort of joyful feeling and an urge to talk. This was absolutely different. I was shaking so hard that I felt people holding me so that I wouldn’t fall off the bed. My body was shaking so hard that it was impossible for me to even say my own name. Somebody gave me an injection which must have been a sedative because I became unconscious. But I was so disorientated I could only just make out human forms. I couldn’t tell whether the person who was giving me the injection was a man or a woman.”

Relieved to have survived the ordeal, Shulmov carried on with his life. Three months later began a series of health problems, mostly related to his kidneys and heart. Since the siege he has spent a month in hospital every year. His greatest dilemma is whether to use his dwindling financial resources to pay for a heart operation or to bribe the authorities not to conscript his son. Alexander worries that in the army his son will suffer a nervous breakdown.

“In the theatre a group of us had a long conversation. Either way, we thought were going to die,” says Shulmov. “We knew that we were going to be killed: either by the people inside the theatre, or by the people outside, the Government. Our Government would never think about saving a life: everyone, the ordinary people, knows that. The Government has a separate existence.”

“State security representatives were already waiting for us. They said that if we wanted to bury her quickly and without any problems, we should not ask unnecessary questions. I agreed. According to protocol, she died in the theatre. But as we learned later, she died in hospital because she was not given any medical help.”

Tomorrow sees the premiere of a play about the siege. Banned from Moscow (as is a film commemorating the events), the play has come to London. Natalia Pelevine wrote In Your Hands after conversations with survivors. For the campaigners, one or two of whom will be in the audience in the New End Theatre in Hampstead, this is a huge moment, an acknowledgement of their efforts and perhaps another step towards embarrassing their Government into a proper investigation.

Is it enough? Zoya Chernetsova is not sure. I met Zoya in Moscow, her face a concentrated frown of grief. Her son Danila had been killed in the siege, three months after his wedding. She explained how her daughter-in-law, pregnant at the time, lost the child; how she met Olga at the graveyard where her son is buried. The two mothers struck up a friendship, a friendship cemented by a determination to uncover the truth.

Zoya says: “We don’t forget despite our Government’s best efforts. The Government has tried to forget the tragedy and whitewash the memory. I have waited four years to get this far. Time is nothing to me: my life is over. I can wait another ten years, twenty. I want to see the Government understand what they have done: they are guilty.”

If an opiate like fentanyl was used in the theatre its effects would include respiratory depression, which could lead to death. Fatalities occurring at the time, or in the immediate aftermath, were almost definitely caused by the agent used. A cut-off of two to four weeks would be my guess for exposure-related death, unless the patient was in hospital for the whole time.

For the size of space in the theatre it is likely that a similar but more potent opiate than fentanyl could have been used. Again, too much of such a drug would cause a fatal suppression of breathing. The after-effects in survivors could include brain damage due to lack of oxygen. At smaller doses this might cause intellectual and memory loss, with a mixture of intellectual and motor impairment in severe cases. If there is not a spectrum of these effects, depending on the degree of acute damage, this is very unlikely to be the explanation for the reported impairment of higher brain function.

There are reports of a period of mood change in the audience, preceding the end of the siege. It seems likely therefore that some attempt at pre-treatment was used. The agent causing death could have been one of a number of chemicals.

Small pupils are a feature of nerve agent and opiate poisoning, and this may have caused some confusion. Nerve agents kill quickly, and have a clear set of symptoms, such as excess salivation, abdominal cramps and blurred vision.

Friday, September 15, 2006

Annals of Cold War II Part 1: Neo-Soviet Russia Announces International Law no Longer Applies to Former USSR

RIA Novosti reports that Russia has unilaterially decided that the United Nations charter has no applicability within the former USSR, where Russian hegemony will decide all conflicts.

MOSCOW, September 13 - Russia is against involving the UN General Assembly in the resolution of long-running conflicts in the former Soviet Union, the Foreign Ministry's official spokesman said Wednesday.

The assembly's general committee discussed September 12 an initiative put forward by Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova to include this issue on the current 61st session's agenda.

Mikhail Kamynin (the demonically Neo-Soviet countenance pictured above left) said that Russia had spoken against this initiative and most members of the general committee had supported its decision. Accordingly, the issue was not added to the session's agenda.

"We have from the outset been against politicizing this issue and involving the General Assembly," Kamynin said.

Russia has had peacekeepers stationed in the conflict zones of unrecognized republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, as well as the self-proclaimed republic of Transdnestr in Moldova, since ceasefires were brokered between the breakaway and central authorities in the early 1990s. Armenia and Azerbaijan have observed an often tense truce over Nagorno-Karabakh, a region in Azerbaijan with a largely Armenian population, since about three years of fighting came to an end in 1994.

"Russia regards attempts to eliminate the existing mechanisms of resolving the Nagorno- Karabakh, Georgian-Abkhazian, Georgian-South Ossetian and Transdnestr conflicts as counter-productive," Kamynin said.

Annals of Cold War II Part 2: At Ground Zero in Moldova

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has maintained an outpost in Molodva since 1993; the region is a flashpoint for skirmishing between the U.S. in Russia as Cold War II unfolds, particularly in the disputed area known as Transnistria. Reader Jeremy Putley directs us to the comments of Moldova scholar Vladimir Socor regarding the replacement of the outpost's former director, William Hill, by Louis O'Neill (pictured). Mr. Putley tells us that "Russia wants to retain its own little enclave sandwiched between Moldova and Ukraine primarily for use as a military base. That is the long and the short of it. The feeble-minded William Hill has been a disaster as head of the OSCE mission in Moldova, and the Russian position has been greatly strengthened as a result of positions he has taken." He relates Socor's analysis, from the Eurasian Daily Monitor, as follows:

A new American chief has just taken over at the OSCE’s Mission in Moldova, scene of a “frozen conflict” orchestrated by Russia on what has now become the border of NATO and the EU. From 1993 to date, the OSCE has attempted in vain to resolve the Transnistria conflict. It is not just the fact of that failure, but the particular ways and means of that failure that have contributed to discrediting this organization as a security actor.

Led by U.S. diplomat William Hill for a record-breaking period of more than six years until August 2006, the OSCE’s Moldova Mission has accumulated considerable political and conceptual ballast that the new Mission Chief, Louis O’Neill, will have to clean out in order to restore the Mission’s credibility.

That problematic legacy stems in part from a few U.S. State Department diplomats of the “Russia-First” school of thought who were in charge of the Transnistria dossier in 1999-2004, and the last of whom left in 2006. It also stems in part from some of their German and French counterparts in the respective capitals and in this Mission from 1994 to date. Moldovan authorities are eager to work closely with the Mission’s new chief: indeed, Chisinau insisted, as did Washington, that the post of Mission Chief remain in American hands, notwithstanding the outgoing chief’s track record. While Washington and Brussels have demonstrated a far clearer understanding of the Transnistria conflict since 2005 than had previously been the case, and corrected their policies accordingly to a significant extent -- as did their representatives at OSCE headquarters in Vienna -- the OSCE’s Moldova Mission awaited its own perestroika.

The Transnistria conflict is not one between two parts of Moldova, or the two banks of the Nistru River and their respective populations, or some kind of inter-communal conflict. The OSCE will continue to fail unless it recognizes the conflict’s real nature: An inter-state conflict in which Russia has seized a part of Moldova’s territory by military force and installed its political and administrative appointees there. The ongoing “negotiating process” and diplomatic terminology long associated with it are obscuring that reality. Imposed by Yevgeny Primakov in 1997 on a then-isolated Moldova, and supported by a line-toeing OSCE Mission to date, that process and that terminology misdefine Transnistria as a “party to the conflict” (ostensibly co-equal with the rest of Moldova); and Russia as “mediator” between two parts of Moldova, ignoring Russia’s actual role as initiator of and party to the ongoing conflict. Moreover, Russia claims the role of “guarantor” of an eventual political settlement of the conflict thus defined.

Those concepts have no basis in any legally valid documents. They are only set in records of discussions within the “negotiating process” over the years, which Moscow and Tiraspol regularly cite in demanding “observance of previously reached agreements” as a condition to progress in the negotiations. Chisinau broke out of that trap in 2004-2005, avoiding any reference to Russia as a “mediator” and “guarantor.” Continuing use by the OSCE of that terminology would be seen, at best, as confirmation that the discredited “negotiating process” goes nowhere; and, at worst, as a fallback to the 2002-2004 policy of consigning Moldova to Russian dominance.

Power-sharing between Chisinau and the Tiraspol authorities, under any constitutional guise -- “federalization,” “autonomy,” “distribution of competencies,” “devolution” -- is a goal that condemns the negotiations and the OSCE itself to failure. The authorities in Tiraspol represent Russia, not the population of Transnistria. As part of any such deal, Moldova would in fact be sharing power with Russia on Moldova’s territory and in the presence of Russian troops. “Federalization” is only the most radical among these power-sharing proposals; and Russia’s 2003 Kozak Memorandum differs only in degree, not in kind, from the 2002-2004 “federalization” project -- a mainly Russian draft championed by the OSCE Mission at the public level. Even now, the departing Hill and others want the Mission to dust off the 2004 “mediators’” document as a basis for negotiations, although Chisinau had rejected all versions of “federalization” in 2004 when it chose Europe over Russia.

A package of military Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM), worked out at the OSCE’s Vienna headquarters and by a French general seconded to the Mission, forms a military accompaniment to the political project of “federalization.” It would legalize Transnistria’s armed forces and put them on a par with Moldova’s army for an open-ended period, for the declared purpose of reducing tension and cutting force levels toward the demilitarization of Moldova’s entire territory, under a Russian-dominated inspection mechanism that could not function effectively in Transnistria. The proposal explicitly exempts Russia’s forces in Moldova from cuts or inspections. Presented officially as late as 2005, the package was publicly criticized by Western military attaches at the OSCE in Vienna as well as by leading analysts in Chisinau. Other than the first, symbolic and redundant step of voluntary exchanges of data on force levels, implementation of this CSBM package would adversely affect Moldova’s security.

The conceptual cleanout ought also to include the postulate that Transnistria possesses a special political identity that could serve as one of the bases for autonomy of the left bank. This postulate originates with the 1994 report of a German diplomat in the OSCE Mission on his first, and brief, assignment to Moldova, where he never returned afterward. In reality, the left-bank and right-bank population contains the same ethnic mix (Moldovans, Ukrainians, and Russians being the main ethnic groups, in that order) with many related families on both banks. The one specific feature in Transnistria, however, is the successful Soviet political socialization among Russian and Russified town dwellers --- a feature hardly worth considering as part of a left-bank political identity, let alone justifying autonomy for the left bank.

Edward Lucas
also has recent comments on the Transdniestria issue. Additional updates can be found here and here.

Chechnya Strikes Again? Or Just total Russian Incompetence?

The BBC reports that Chechens rebels have claimed they shot down a Russian helicopter, killing eleven Russian soliders including two generals. The Russians claim the helicopter crashed into a tree. Which version is more compelling proof of Russia's total military failure in the region? You decide.

Islamist rebels claim they shot down a Russian military helicopter which crashed on Tuesday killing 11 people, including high-ranking officers. The Mi-8 helicopter came down in Russia's North Ossetia region in the Caucasus. A little known insurgency group said in a statement on a Chechen rebel website that the Mi-8 was taken down, using a shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missile. Russian military say the most likely cause of the crash was poor visibility. The defence ministry in Moscow confirmed that two generals were among the dead but has not released the names of those killed. One of the commanders in the North Caucasus District was among the dead, officials said. The insurgency group, calling itself the Ossetia Jamaat, claims it shot down the helicopter after receiving intelligence that it was carrying high-ranking officers. The ministry has not commented on the statement. Defence ministry officials, quoted in the Russian media, say the aircraft struck a tree in thick fog during exercises near Vladikavkaz, the provincial capital of North Ossetia. However Russian media quoted investigators saying they are looking into all possible causes, including hostile action.

Talking Turkey About Racism in Russia

The New York Times report on the Kondopoga pogroms raises several interesting points. What follows are key sentences (in black) together with La Russophobe's comments (in red):

Ethnic animosity runs so close to the surface of Russian society that almost anything can cause it to boil over. LR: That just about says it all, doesn't it? Well, not quite though.

Two ethnic Russians had died by the time the brawl ended, but the violence had only just begun. Their deaths — at the hands of men from Azerbaijan and Chechnya — provoked angry protests and on the night of Sept. 2, a rampage through the town, followed by sporadic acts of vandalism that have continued since. LR: Problem number one in dealing with racism in Russia is language. "Ethnic Russians" is a term that could easily confuse many. There are two words for "Russian" in the Russian language, unlike in America where there is only one word "American." Russians have the word "Русский" (ROO-skee) and they have the word "Российский" ("ra-SEE-skee"). If you put the word "Russian" into an online dictionary, the translation you will get is "русский" -- this is roughly like putting "American" into such a dictionary and getting back a Russian word which means "KKK member." To put it a bit more kindly, it's as if there was a single word in English that meant "native born American with white skin." "Русский" means Slavic; it means "real Russian." It means "Russian by blood." If you put in "Российский," however, you'll get an indication that the word doesn't exist. This is the word Russians use to refer to people from Chechnya, supposedly Russian citizens but "not really." It means non-Slavic. It means "Russian by law." It means you have a target on your back. The mere existence of these two words is proof positive that the first sentence above was correct. In fact, a considerable understatement. The difference is made clear at the end of the piece where the Times reports:

Oksana N. Boganova is a Russian who works at one of the stores badly damaged in the rampage, the Azeri-owned Flamingo. It reopened a week after the attack, now with a guard on duty. She lamented what happened and expressed fear of what lay ahead. “I do not know whom we are afraid of,” she said, “the non-Russians or the Russians.”

The Times got sucked into the vortex listening to Ms. Boganova and forgot to insert "ethnic" before "Russian" just like she did, because "everyone knows" that there is only one word that actually means "Russian" and that's "Русский." There's a "Русский" and there's a "non-Russian." Away from the vortex, it should at least be "ethnic Russians and "non-ethnic Russians" or more accurately "racist Russian citizens" and "their dark-skinned, Russian citizen victims." It should be noted that "Российский" is not like "African-American." The term "African-American" is a term invented and applied by dark-skinned minorities themselves, not a term applied to the group by the racist majority. When used by the majority, it's a term of respect. "Российский" when used by Slavs is a term of opprobrium, a subtext for polite company. Those who use the term couldn't care less what the dark-skinned poeple themselves what to be called.

Mobs of young men — fueled by anger and, officials said, alcohol — burned the Seagull club, owned by a businessman originally from Azerbaijan. Then they attacked a series of precisely chosen targets: the homes and businesses of migrants from the Caucasus, mostly from Chechnya. LR: Makes it seem that they were keeping a list of all such places for just such an occasion, doesn't it?

Dozens of the town’s residents, Chechens mostly, but also ethnic Azerbaijanis and Georgians, fled that night. A group of 49 are now staying in a tourist camp outside the regional capital, Petrozavodsk, having escaped what is being widely called a pogrom, one that many here welcomed. LR: When the USSR collapsed, many Russophile maniacs said that Russia "could never turn the clock back" to Soviet times. In fact, not only could Russians in fact do so, but they could turn the clock simultaneously back past Soviet times to the days of the pogrom. Neat trick, isn't it? Next time you hear a Russophile maniac spouting his garbage, remember that.

“They need to leave,” said Denis Doronin, 19, who said he took part in the protests that led to the violence. “They arrive from another country and they act like kings.” LR: This is some real truth. For the "Русский" a Chechen is "from another country" -- except, that is, when they want independence or when foreigners want to help them; then they are "part of Russia" and nobody can say differently.

Ethnic tensions across Russia have been fueled by the latent racism common among many Russians, who freely use the pejorative “blacks” when describing people from the Caucasus, even in casual conversation. LR: More linguistic trouble here. When you take the Russian word for "black" and make it into a noun (say "CHOR-nik"), you get the Russian equivalent of the English word "nigger." This is how most Russians naturally refer to people with dark skin. If they wanted to be more respectful, they'd use the word "Российский" -- that's what it 's there for.

It also reflects a growing political opposition to migrant workers not unlike those movements in Europe and the United States and the indifferent or at times hostile responses from elected officials when violence erupts. LR: God help the dark-skinned people of Russia if they ever take it into their heads to become a public political force. If the Kremlin was prepared to arrest the president of Yukos, put him through a neo-Soviet show trial and sentence him to years in Siberia because he tried to get political, can you imagine what it's prepared to do to the dark-skinned? Or more precisely, to allow to be done by others while it turns the other way?

“The behavior of certain young men who moved here from the Caucasus and other territories in recent years — not that many of them, but they were visible — has been beyond the pale," said Sergei L. Katanandov, governor of Karelia, the region near Finland that includes Kondopoga in an interview with Izvestia on Thursday. LR: That's right, the governor blamed the darkies. By the way, this man is a presidential appointee, not an elected leader. "President" Putin appoints all of Russia's governors. Now, a really crazed Russophile would have you believe that this man is just like George Wallace during the 1960s in America, and tell you that Russia simply "needs time" to learn racial tolerance just like America did. There are are couple of problems with this line of total B.S. First, if its true, it means Russia is an uncivilized country, inferior to the West. But Russia demands equal treatment in Western groups like the U.N. and G-8. Second, there have always been, even in the time of slavery, high-profile leaders of both races in the United States publicly opposing racism and race violence. America fought a war over it more than a century ago. Neither of these points are true in Russia. Try to name Russia's Martin Luther King or imagine how he could emerge. You can't. If he did appear, he'd be Khodorkovskized faster than you could say Jackie Robinson.

The economic success of migrants is at the source of many xenophobic statements, even ones by prominent officials. The country’s leading nationalist politician, Vladimir V. Zhirinovsky, said migrants should be barred from owning markets or shops, hotels, restaurants and bars.“Restaurants and retail outlets should be in the hands of local residents, first and foremost,” he said in a radio interview after the violence in Kondopoga. “Otherwise clashes with local residents are inevitable.” LR: Russians polled said that Zhirinovsky is the sexiest man in Russia. He called for racist pogroms (and a new cold war with the United States) more than a decade ago. Now he's making policy.

“They completely control the prices at the market,”said [one white woman who would not give her name] of the Chechens. “They buy all the potatoes in Karelia. Potatoes are like our second bread. They buy them for 7 rubles and sell them for 15. They do not even work. They just speculate.” Meantime, she added, “Ours are unemployed.” LR: And, she forgot to add, the fact that we white Russians have elected a proud KGB spy as our president, a spy who has abolished the election of governors, destroyed TV news and hoarded the nation's oil revenues has nothing to do with anything.

UPDATE: Here's a classic bit of Russophile gibberish from an ignorant moron named Nikolay in the comment section. He correctly noted that we misspelled "Российский" as "Россиский" but he didn't even put the correct spelling into the online dictionary we mentioned to see if it would change the substance of our text. It doesn't. You can put "Российский" into the Babelfish translator and get "Russian" as a result, and there are of course plenty of dictionaries that will give you "Russian" if you type in "Российский" -- but they won't won't tell you a thing about the difference between this word and "Русский" and many (most?) won't give you "Российский" as a variant if you type in Russian. Note that we didn't say the word "Российский" doesn't exist, we simply said it's a second class racist word in the Russian language. If you study Russian, you meet "Русский" but will have a hard time coming across "Российский." Basically, what the fire-breathing Russophile Nikolay has done is to feverishly search through our text looking for mistakes so he can ridicule our Russian -- in other words, a classic show of Russian xenophobia and paranoia. Where Russians should be encouraging foreigners in using their dying language, instead they attack them. By the way, Nikolay is just mad because he claimed, outrageously, on his blog that people accuse him of being a Russophobe and when La Russophobe challenged him to post a link proving his claim he, of course, failed to do so. Nikolay likes to poke fun at those who dare to use online translators to speak Russian, but he doensn't make fun of Russians who speak English badly. That's because he's such a Russophobe, of course.

Thursday, September 14, 2006

Monitoring the Media: Reviewing the Russian Genocide in Ukraine in the 1930s

Recently, La Russophobe warned readers to be wary of news reports on Russia written by partipants in the Kremlin's all-expense-paid propaganda orgy called "The Valdai Club." To illustrate the kind of things that can go wrong, let's take a walk down memory lane.

On June 4, 1931, A. W. Kleifoth of the U.S. Embassy in Berlin wrote a memo to his superiors at the State Department in Washington DC regarding a meeting he had just had with Walter Duranty (pictured), the Pulitzer-prize-winning Russia correspondent for the New York Times. The two discussed the status of the upcoming Russian grain harvest and speculated about whether the famine conditions that were spreading through the USSR would worsen. Kleifoth states as follows regarding Duranty's intention to report negative developments coming out of the Soviet Union in his paper: "in agreement with the New York Times and the Soviet authorities, his official despatches always reflect the official position of the Soviet regime and not his own."

Duranty's reporting on the Soviet Union was subsequently exposed and discredited. Most particularly aggrieved are members of the Ukrainian community, because Russians caused Ukrainians to bear the lion's share of the burden for the Stalin famines, and millions perished. Duranty knew about this virtual genocide of the Ukrainian nation by Russia, but he did not publish a word about it. The Times itself has recognized this, but it hasn't dealt at all with the aspect of the Kleiforth memo which indicates that the paper's misreporting on the Soviet Union was a matter of editorial policy. Instead, the Times strategy has been to blame Duranty, and at the same time to rationalize his reporting by spewing the utterly false propaganda that the defects appeared only in hindsight. As noted in the link above, an e-mail sent to Insight magazine by Catherine Mathis, vice president of corporate communications at the New York Times Co., explained: "'The Times has not seen merit in trying to undo history'" by returning the Pulitzer. The e-mail insists: 'The Times has reported often and thoroughly on the defects in Duranty's journalism, as viewed through the lens of later events.'" In fact, Duranty's comment in the memo makes it seem that the pro-Soviet reporting was more his editor's notion than his own, something the editors would obviously love to sweep under the carpet; the publishers of the Times refused to be interviewed about the reporting when they were contacted by the prestigious Columbia Journalism Review. Moreover, of course, the Times has not undertaken any review of its pro-Soviet editorial line at that time, of which we can hear the echo even in today's Times editorials. In other words, Duranty's misreporting served not only the interests of the USSR but the political agenda of the Times editors themselves.

Here are some examples of the boldfaced lies the Times told its readers under Duranty's pen, lies which prevented the world from being aware of the problem in Ukraine and therefore cost lives:

"There is no famine or actual starvation nor is there likely to be."
--New York Times, Nov. 15, 1931, page 1

"Any report of a famine in Russia is today an exaggeration or malignant propaganda."
--New York Times, August 23, 1933

"Enemies and foreign critics can say what they please. Weaklings and despondents at home may groan under the burden, but the youth and strength of the Russian people is essentially at one with the Kremlin's program, believes it worthwhile and supports it, however hard be the sledding."
--New York Times, December 9, 1932, page 6

"You can't make an omelet without breaking eggs."
--New York Times, May 14, 1933, page 18

"There is no actual starvation or deaths from starvation but there is widespread mortality from diseases due to malnutrition."
--New York Times, March 31, 1933, page 13

The Times editorial line throughout the Soviet era was that Russia was a nation full of brave and brilliant forward-thinkers leading the world to a socialist utopia. If there was dicatorship and human suffering along the way, this was due mostly to the harassment of the Soviet state by the ignorant outsiders who failed to understand it as well as the brilliant Times itself, and the rest of the blame was due to a "few bad apples" in the Soviet barrel as well as the need to "break a few eggs" (and skulls?) when forming a great social experiment. Given the chance, the Times harrangued, Russians would build a democratic socialist paradise the world would envy.

This line took the Times editors into very dangerous territory in 2000, when the Russian people freely elected a proud KGB spy as their president. This was something truly shocking for the Times, and placed it in a position to have its entire Cold War philosphy exposed as a fraud. Just as Putin was beginning his crackdown, including a barbaric assault on Chechnya, the Times experienced its massive scandal with reporter Jayson Blair being exposed for simply inventing front-page news stories out of whole cloth. To put it mildly, the editors weren't prepared to take two black eyes. So they scrambled for a way out.

Their solution was this: Cast Putin as a "necessary transition" between the USSR and democracy. Blame capitalism for throwing Russia into economic tumult, and claim that Putin's tough tactics were necessary to right the foundering ship of state. Report mostly good news about Russia, especially where the economy is concerned. Check out the NYT coverage during that time, you'll see that is what transpired.

And now the editors are biding their time. How long does it take for a "transitional" figure to morph into a glorious democratic socialist? How long can you gloss over things like the abolition of elected governors, the obliteration of independent TV and providing aid and comfort to rogue entities like Iran, Venezuela, Hamas and Hezbollah? Long enough so that your pro-Soviet stance gets obscure enough that nobody can quite remember it?

We shall see.

FYI: To read more about how the New York Times misleads readers for ideological reasons, check out Michelle Malkin's piece about their Wal-mart scandal.

LR on PP

Check out La Russophobe's latest on Publius Pundit, exposing the Valdai Discussion Club. This piece provides a nice practical example of the issues dealt with in the post above regarding the reliability of traditional media reporting on Russia and the importance of having alternative sources of information such as Publius and this blog. Your comments about the infuence of the Valdai club and the Kremlin's general offensive to control its image are welcome and important.

Stalin the Sex God

La Russophobe has already reported that Russians identified Vladimir Zhirinovksy as the sexiest man alive. Now comes news that their next new screen love god will be none other than Stalin himself. The Scotsman reports that Russia is about to release a new film about crazed dictator Joseph Stalin depicting the mass murderer as a red hot lover.

He has been worshipped, feared, and even denounced. But now the sexy side of Joseph Stalin is being exposed in a controversial Russian film.

The Soviet tyrant's relationship with a woman 22 years his junior is to be turned into a steamy TV and film drama this autumn.

The production team admits it will provoke a storm of anger in Russia and reignite the debate over the portrayal of one of history's most infamous dictators who sent millions to their deaths.

It comes a year after German filmmakers sparked a major row by depicting Hitler as warm and caring in the film Downfall.

Yevo Zhena, or 'His Wife', is being made as a £1.5m four-part blockbuster to be shown on the Rossiya TV Channel this autumn. There are also plans for a feature-film version to be sold internationally.

The drama focuses on Stalin's relationship with his second wife, Nadezhda Alliluyeva, and depicts the feared ruler as a passionate lover who missed the climax of the Russian Revolution because he was in bed with Alliluyeva, then a teenager.

The two first met in 1908. He was 30 and she was eight when her father, Sergei Alliluyeva, offered Stalin shelter after he had escaped from prison. Stalin's first wife, Ekaterina Svanidze, had died a year earlier after four years of marriage.

Stalin and Alliluyeva married in 1919 and had an often stormy relationship until she mysteriously died in 1932.

The film shows them striking up a romantic attachment in early 1917, after he returned from exile in Siberia. One scene sees Stalin helping the nervous teenager undress, and in another he pulls her into a bath with him.

Even more controversially, the film claims that he missed the storming of the Winter Palace during the October Revolution because he was in bed with Alliluyeva. As they listen to the shooting outside, Stalin casually remarks that the Bolsheviks may or may not have taken power. Yevo Zhena is based on a book published in 2001, called The Only Women, which was based on new material from archives but which dramatised the gaps between what could be proved from research.

The film takes the scholars' view of Alliluyeva's death, saying that she committed suicide after a public row, and dismisses popular conspiracy theories suggesting Stalin murdered her or had her killed.

After Stalin insults her at a banquet, she is shown walking through the Kremlin alone, and then a shot is heard.

Mira Todorovskaya, the co-director, said: "Stalin was a devil and monster, but in our film you can't see that. LR: You couldn't see it in his propaganda either, see above right; indeed, what woman in her right mind could resist this charming he-man? See, the girls can't keep their hands off!

"People will say that we have beautified Stalin and made him not as he was in real life. But I think my film will have opponents from both sides."

Todorovskaya said she believed that Alliluyeva helped keep Stalin's behaviour under control, calling her "his second conscience".

Historian Simon Sebag Montefiore, who wrote a best-selling book on the Soviet tyrant, Stalin: Court Of The Red Tsar, and who is now researching a volume on Stalin's early life to be published next April, said: "It's not correct to say that he missed out on the Revolution. He didn't help storm the buildings, but that's because he didn't have a military role. He was the editor of Pravda, which was a very important job because the paper was crucial in the days before radio and television.

"The producers are right to dismiss the conspiracy theories about Stalin killing her or having her killed. All the evidence points to her having committed suicide.

"Alliluyeva's death did affect Stalin, although I disagree with the suggestion that she kept him in check or acted as a 'conscience'. He was extremely brutal before she died. But losing her helped make him more paranoid and affected his views of families and spouses, such as imprisoning or torturing wives of suspects."

Dr Andrei Rogatchevski, a lecturer in Russian culture at Glasgow University, said: "It will be very interesting and will spark a lot of debate. There are still some who are nostalgic for the kind of strong leadership which Stalin gave. They don't want the gulags or terror back, but they believe that such a vast country can only be ruled by a strong man like Stalin. They won't like Stalin being portrayed as missing the Revolution to be with his lover.

"Many others in Russia will not like to see a man who caused the death of millions being seen as loving and tender. As well as the terror, many still blame Stalin for the blunders at the beginning of the Second World War which cost millions of lives and allowed the Germans to advance into Russia."

Three years after Stalin's death, the 'excesses' of his rule were denounced by Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, who announced a policy of "De-Stalinisation."

In the film, Stalin is played by award-winning Georgian actor Duta Skhirtladze, with Olga Budina starring as his young lover.

Budina recently played the part of Grand Duchess Anastasia, the youngest daughter of the last Russian tsar, Nicholas II.

Anastasia's fate has been the subject of even more debate than Alliluyeva, with many believing Anastasia survived the murder of the Imperial family in 1918 and managed to escape to the West.

Russian Cops, Worse than Criminals, Think Rubber Hoses are Just Dandy

The Moscow Times reports the shocking results of a Levada Center poll showing that a majority of Russian policeman feel it is appropriate police procedure to beat a confession out of a suspect. Maybe visas to Russia should be accompanied by a cyanide pill so that the hapless tourist who finds himself arrested can check out before the "interrogation" quite literally kicks in.

More than half of the nation's police officers say it is sometimes acceptable to use force against detained suspects, while nearly two in 10 believe it is sometimes acceptable to plant drugs or weapons on suspects, a report from the independent Levada Center showed.

"The erosion of legal awareness among police officers is at its highest level," said Lev Gudkov, a center researcher. "The notion of what's lawful and what isn't is warped."

The center polled 641 policemen in 41 cities in December 2005 as part of a two-year project with Public Verdict, a group that monitors police abuse.

On Tuesday, the two groups presented their findings in a newly released book, "Index of Abuse by Law Enforcement Agencies."

Police officers also tend to believe the media is responsible for sowing public discontent: Fifty-five percent say the media is the No. 1 reason for their poor image.

A spokesman at the Interior Ministry, which oversees the police force, declined to comment until he had seen the book.

The Levada Center report also showed that, over the two-year period, hostility toward the police was consistently high. Monthly updates showed that, at some points, as many as two-thirds of all Russians distrusted the police; at other points, that figure jumped to three-fourths.

While the level of trust in all authorities -- the army, the courts, the security services and the police -- rose briefly after President Vladimir Putin took power in early 2000, that trust ebbed as hopes for internal reforms sank.

About 1.2 percent of the population views a job in the police force as "prestigious," while 2.5 percent considers it "attractive," said Olga Gryaznova, a Levada Center researcher. Such public sentiment contributes to police officers' negative image of the police and hinders improvement of relations between the police and the public, Gryaznova added.

Topping most Russians' list of fears when it comes to the police is public humiliation, followed by violence, illegal detention, blackmail and illegal incrimination, among other concerns, the study showed.

A police colonel with more than 30 years of experience, speaking on condition of anonymity, said there were fewer professionals working in the police force than there were in the 1980s.
The police colonel added that the Interior Ministry's reform of the police force had not included educating street cops who interact directly with the general public.

Россия в раковине гайки (Russia in a nutshell)

One of the lead stories in the Moscow Times yesterday was captioned:

Alcohol Reform has Lethal Consequences
*
The country has seen a spike in the number of people who have died or suffered illnesses in the past six weeks from drinking disinfectants following a government campaign to purge stores of fake liquor.

That's right. Russian launches an attempt to protect people from alcohol and more people are injured by it after the attempt than were harmed before it was made. That's Russia in a nutshell. The campaign sharply increased the price of alcohol, driving more and more people to use the dangerous stuff. When asked about these fatalities, a government official is quoted as saying: ""These people are mostly from dysfunctional families, homeless or unemployed. Two or three [of the victims] are young people who drank the alcohol accidentally, but the rest have unhealthy lifestyles." In other words, "good riddance." About 40,000 people are estimated to die annually in Russia from alcohol poisoning; the country experiences a net annual population loss of nearly 1 million.

And that's not the half of it. Because not only has that "campaign" increased the number of fatalities, it's also resulted in the disappearance of many safe forms of alcohol from Russia's shelves, including such things as French wine. And all this while Russians are screeching to high heaven about the evil influence of Georgian vino on Russian society.

Wednesday, September 13, 2006

As Gas Prices Tumble, so do Russia's Economic Prospects

Americans have been seeing a marked decrease in the price of gasoline at the pump recently, so without even being told so you know that the Russian stock market has plunged. Indeed, RIA Novosti reported yesterday that it lost more than 3% of its value in just one day. As the article makes clear, Mideast turmoil is now directly in Russia's financial interests; the more stability in the region, the more dire Russia's economic prospects become. The article also makes clear the total rejection of the world community of the Russian market beyond the oil industry, something that hardly needs saying except for the fact that the propagandists' mental block persists.

MOSCOW, September 11 (RIA Novosti) - The Russian stock market suffered a new setback Monday after world oil prices fell.

At 16:30 p.m. Moscow time (12:30 p.m. GMT), the index of the Moscow Inter-Bank Currency Exchange (MICEX) slipped 3.5% on Friday's close, to 1,356.67 points.

The biggest fall was registered in the stocks of the crude producer Tatneft (4.77%), the metals giant Norilsk Nickel (4.65%), the oil firm Surgutneftegaz (4.38%), the energy giant Gazprom (3.98%) and the independent crude producer LUKoil (3.94%).

"The continued fall in oil prices has dealt a new blow to the Russian stock market," said Denis Barabanov, an analyst with Bitza-Invest investment firm.

The index of the Russian Trading System (RTS) declined 2.65%, to 1,549.03 points. The biggest decline among blue chips on the RTS stock market involved shares of the state-run retail savings bank Sberbank (6.8%), the gold mining company Polyus Zoloto (4.7%) and Gazprom (4%).

"Oil prices fell to a five-month low, and are now close to $65 per barrel," Barabanov said. At the same time, he said, price fluctuations on international oil markets were not related to fundamental changes in supply and demand.

"Any hint of a worsening situation in the Middle East may reverse the prevailing trend," he said. LR: Is this sick or what? The guy sounds almost wistful: "Oh please God, just let them start killing Americans again someplace where it's sandy."

In addition to oil price dynamics, experts also said Russian stocks do not enjoy foreign investors' support. There was no large inflow of nonresidents into the domestic stock market in the fall, and Russian traders started to close long positions opened during the summer.

Some experts said global investors have not lost interest in the Russian market. But growth in stock markets will begin only after the U.S. Federal Reserve clarifies its interest rate position at its regular meeting September 20, said Vladimir Detinich, the head of the analysis department at Olma investment fund.

Experts said stock prices could register some upward correction, unless oil prices renew their record lows Tuesday. Moreover, many stocks will be attractive to buyers following their price slump Monday.

Russian Racism Increases by 20-30% Each Year

The French Press Agency reports:

Thirty-three people have been killed in Russia in racist attacks so far this year, the Sova xenophobia research center said Friday. "In Moscow, 27 people died in racist attacks and 147 have been injured this year alone. In Saint-Petersburg, four murders have been committed and 25 have been injured," Sova's deputy director Galina Kozhevnikova was quoted as saying by the Interfax news agency. Last year, 393 people were injured and 35 killed, Kozhevnikova said, adding that "we have recently seen growth in violence of 20-30 percent per year on average."

Skinheads, whose numbers are estimated at 50,000 in Russia, tend to target people from the Caucasus and Central Asia as well as youth subcultures and sexual minorities.

Notice that virtually all the killings Sova is aware of come from Moscow and St. Petersburg. Russia is a land that stretches across eleven time zones, so it is a virtual certainty that there is much violence going on out in the provinces which isn't reported to Sova.